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ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Digital Innovation from an Intellectual Property Rights Perspective 
 
BY 
 
Zhitao Yin 
 
July 2019 
 
 
Committee Chair: Arun Rai 
Major Academic Unit: Center for Process Innovation 
 & Department of Computer Information Systems 
 
This dissertation uses the lens of intellectual property rights (IPR) to challenge the Information 
Systems (IS) field’s conventional view of a patent as a knowledge asset. It shows how IS 
scholars can leverage the IPR perspective to generate insights into digital innovation and how 
those insights can inform innovation policy, which establishes the regulatory governance 
framework for the digital innovation ecosystem.  
Essay 1 aims to shift the focus of the literature on the production of digital innovation to the 
examination of digital patents. It surfaces (a) the critical beneficial influence of patent 
examiners’ feedback—that is, why the claims of inventors’ past applications have been 
rejected—on inventors’ success in gaining subsequent digital patents and (b) how that benefit is 
subject to two key aspects of examiners’ feedback—temporal and technological. Essay 1 
therefore informs a debate among scholars and policy makers regarding the expertise of patent 
examiners in digital patents.  
Essays 2 and 3 turn to the value creation of digital innovation, in which patent owners generate 
rent from their patents at the expense of social welfare. Specifically, Essay 2 joins the discussion 
on patent thickets—the overlapping of firms’ IPR that may restrict their commercialization of 
their own inventions—while addressing the formation of patent thickets in the IT industry, in 
which firms are racing to assemble large patent portfolios. Results indicate that the knowledge 
spillover to competitors generated by a focal IT firm’s patent disclosure can increase the level of 
patent thickets. Such impact depends on two key characteristics—the value of the focal firm’s 
disclosure and the absorptive capacity of that firm’s competitors. Essay 2 therefore uncovers the 
crucial role of disclosure for the optimal policy design to address patent thickets.  
Essay 3 connects with the recent conversation on the role of crowdfunding in democratizing 
venture capital (VC) financing, while differentiating itself by addressing the IPR threat from a 
patent assertion entity (PAE), which is in the business of asserting digital patents. Results 
indicate that state anti-PAE laws are crucial in realizing two crowdfunding benefits: attracting 
VC investment into the state and diversifying the investments across industries within the state. 
Essay 3 thus surfaces the critical role that institutional governance of IPR risk plays in achieving 
crowdfunding benefits.  
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Introduction 
Digital innovation has radically changed the nature of new products and services and spawned 
novel pathways for the creation and appropriation of value (Nambisan et al. 2017). With 
innovation becoming increasingly dependent on software, digital patents are increasingly 
important for innovation in industries well beyond the traditional definition of electronics and 
information technology (IT). This shift attracts great interest from economists, strategic 
management scholars, and legal scholars, all of whom have a long tradition of examining 
innovation from the perspective of intellectual property rights (IPR). But it also offers a fantastic 
opportunity for information systems (IS) scholars, who have a unique contribution to make by 
generating interdisciplinary insights while making disciplinary contributions. Additionally, the 
IPR perspective offers the opportunity to broaden the focus of IS research on digital innovation 
from private-sector value creation to innovation policy, which establishes the regulatory 
governance framework for the digital innovation ecosystem.  
An emerging discussion among IS scholars with respect to patents has mainly taken a knowledge 
perspective and explored the underlying mechanisms of generating patents and creating value 
from them (e.g., Joshi et al. 2010; Kleis et al. 2012; Ravichandran et al. 2017; Wu et al. 
forthcoming). However, patents are not merely a representation of knowledge. By providing 
inventors with a temporary period of market power by granting them IPR, patents aim to 
incentivize innovation by allowing inventors to recoup the fixed costs of their research 
investments. The patent office’s examination of patent applications is therefore critical in the 
production of digital innovation, yet has not been considered in the scholarly discussion.  
In addition, patents, once granted, may not actually encourage innovation, but rather generate 
significant deadweight loss (Williams 2017). Patent owners may leverage the market power of 
8 
 
their patents to generate rent for themselves at the expense of social welfare. For example, IT 
firms are racing to assemble large patent portfolios to reserve a better position from which to 
commercialize their inventions. However, such actions collectively form a dense web of 
overlapping IPR—so-called patent thickets—in the IT industry, which distorts incentives to 
innovate and raises risks for competition and consumers (Federal Trade Commission 2012). It is 
therefore crucial to understand the mechanisms and contextual conditions of the formation of 
patent thickets in the IT industry in order to advance theory and empirical evidence of the 
mechanisms of patent thicket formation and to provide a robust basis for policy.   
Recent years have seen an increasing problem of patent trolling (Cohen et al. 2016). A patent 
assertion entity (PAE)—a so-called patent troll—is in the business of buying, selling, and 
asserting digital patents. In fact, PAEs are responsible for a growing percentage of lawsuits in the 
IT industry (Federal Trade Commission 2012), making them a particularly salient risk factor in 
the financing and market viability of entrepreneurs. It is therefore important to take the risk of 
such deadweight loss from PAEs into account while understanding how digital innovations are 
financed and produced in the digital innovation ecosystem. The financing involves both venture 
capitalists and crowdfunding platforms, with the latter generating signals on potential investment 
opportunities for venture capitalists but also for PAEs. Understanding how signals from 
crowdfunding platforms affect the flow of venture capital, conditional on regulatory mechanisms 
to mitigate PAE risks, is therefore necessary to better understand effective governance of the 
digital innovation ecosystem.   
By addressing these issues, the three essays in this dissertation take an important step in 
understanding the production and value creation of digital innovation through the lens of IPR. 
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In the first essay, I focus on the examination process for digital patents, in which patent 
examiners provide inventors with feedback with respect to innovativeness against their claims 
for IPR. By leveraging the history of the inventors with respect to the feedback received from US 
patent examiners in 2008–2017, I provide consistent evidence that examiners’ feedback can 
reduce the chance of rejection for digital patent applications. Additionally, an inventor benefits 
more when the feedback is linked to temporally distant knowledge and to knowledge in diverse 
technology fields. This essay contributes to digital innovation by revealing the entire pipeline of 
the patent application process and the critical role of examiners’ feedback. 
Essay 2 aims to understand the formation of patent thickets in the IT industry. Specifically, what 
underlying mechanism establishes the IPR overlap among IT firms that may keep them from 
commercializing their inventions? With the enactment of the American Inventor’s Protection Act 
(AIPA) in 2000, a firm must publicly disclose a patent application 18 months after filing. I 
outline two competing predictions on how pre-grant patent disclosure will affect the firm’s IPR 
overlap with competitors: (a) a constraining influence due to patent examiners’ evaluations that 
take the pre-grant disclosures into account while assessing competitors’ patent claims and (b) 
knowledge spillover when technical information and market signals are revealed to competitors. 
To evaluate these competing explanations, I exploit a natural experiment: the enactment of 
AIPA. Results indicate that the knowledge spillover effect dominates, especially when the 
disclosure’s technological value—that is, the extent to which the focal patent destabilizes the 
technological landscape (Funk and Owen-Smith 2017)—and the market value—that is, the stock 
market reaction to the grant of focal patent (Kogan et al. 2017)—are high. Moreover, the effect is 
more pronounced when the focal IT firm and its competitors are in similar technology spaces and 
product markets. This essay reveals the innovation interdependency among IT firms in terms of 
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IPR and uncovers the underlying mechanism by which it evolves. Thus, it provides more 
nuanced evidence of the dynamics of innovation in the IT industry. 
Essay 3 takes into account crowdfunding platforms, such as Kickstarter, which are increasingly 
important for financing innovation and entrepreneurship and can generate high-quality signals 
that attract venture capitalists (VCs) to new regions. Unfortunately, taking advantage of this 
benefit brings with it a growing IPR risk from patent trolls, who often send bad-faith demand 
letters to thousands of businesses, counting on their lack of experience with the patent system to 
coerce them into paying settlements. By leveraging a quasi-experiment—the enactment of state 
anti-PAE laws in 2010–2017—I use a multi-site entry difference-in-differences relative time 
model and find strong evidence that a state’s enactment of anti-PAE laws is critical in realizing 
two crowdfunding benefits: attracting VC investment into the state and diversifying the 
investments across industries within the state. This essay widens the focus of the crowdfunding 
literature from market efficiency to the democratization of the flow of VC financing, while 
surfacing the critical role of institutional governance of IPR risk in achieving this benefit. 
Collectively, the essays in this dissertation use the lens of IPR to challenge the IS field’s 
conventional view of a patent as a knowledge asset. Specifically, by zooming in on the patent 
examination process and on the deadweight loss brought by patent thickets and patent trolls, I 
show how an IPR perspective can contribute to our understanding of the production and value 
creation of digital innovation and how that understanding can inform innovation policy, which 
establishes the regulatory governance framework for the digital innovation ecosystem. 
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Essay 1 
 
Does Feedback on Failure Affect Future Success? 
Patent Examiner Feedback to Inventors of Digital Innovation 
 
 
 
Abstract 
As digital patents become increasingly dominant in innovation, scholars seek to understand the 
inventors’ search for combinations of ideas in the knowledge landscape, characterized by patents 
granted. This research framework, however, does not consider the patent examination process in 
which inventors receive feedback with respect to innovativeness against their claims for 
intellectual property rights. By leveraging the history of the inventors with respect to the 
feedback received from examiners in the US patent examination process in 2008–2017, I provide 
consistent evidence that examiners’ feedback can reduce the chance of rejection for applications 
for digital patents. Additionally, an inventor benefits more when the feedback is linked to 
temporally distant knowledge and to knowledge in diverse technology fields. This study enriches 
the production of digital innovation by revealing the entire pipeline of the patent application 
process and uncovers the critical role of examiners’ feedback in the success of a patent 
application. 
 
Keywords: Inventor failure, patent examination outcome, examiner feedback,  
 digital innovation, intellectual property rights 
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Research Problem Formulation 
Digital patents (e.g., for software) have been generating great interest among practitioners and 
scholars. IT firms are pouring enormous resources into such visions of the future as autonomous 
cars. Google, for instance, has racked up more patents than most automakers have in the 
connected and self-driving technology space.1 With innovation becoming increasingly dependent 
on software (Arora et al. 2013), recent scholarly conversation indicates that digital patents not 
only create value for IT firms (Chung et al. 2018; Hall and MacGarvie 2010) but also are 
increasingly important for innovation in many other sectors (Branstetter et al. 2018; Chan et al. 
2018).  
Given the benefits arising from patents, scholarly conversations in economics and strategy have 
focused on how to generate patents by taking a knowledge production perspective, in which 
inventors seek to combine previously disconnected ideas across different technological domains 
(Fleming 2001; Fleming and Sorenson 2001, 2004). However, the highest-impact inventions are 
primarily grounded in conventional combinations of prior work, while featuring cross-domain 
combinations (Kim et al. 2016). In search of such inventions, team collaboration reduces the 
probability of very poor outcomes via more rigorous selection processes while increasing the 
probability of extremely successful outcomes as a result of greater knowledge combination 
opportunities (Singh and Fleming 2010).   
With the prevalent use of digital technologies, IS scholars join this conversation by pointing out 
that digital technology is an important input to the patent generation process (Bardhan et al. 
2013; Joshi et al. 2010; Kleis et al. 2012; Ravichandran et al. 2017). The focus of IS research has 
                                                             
1 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverwyman/2017/05/17/google-racks-up-more-
patents-than-most-automakers-on-connected-and-self-driving-cars/#5d38b2bf41ef. 
13 
 
been the role of digital technologies in the search for relevant knowledge and in the coordination 
of collaboration among inventors. For instance, data analytics technology can accelerate search 
by enabling existing knowledge to be identified, accessed, and combined (Saldanha et al. 2017), 
especially when innovation requires intensive information processing and search from diverse 
sources of prior technology (Wu et al. forthcoming). From the perspective of team collaboration, 
collaborative technologies enable inventor teams in search of knowledge combination to benefit 
from specialization and division of labor by reducing coordination costs (Forman et al. 2012).  
Patents, however, are not merely a representation of knowledge. As property rights providing 
inventors with a temporary period of market power, they aim to incentivize innovation by 
allowing inventors to recoup the fixed costs of their research investments (Williams 2017). To 
gain those intellectual property rights (IPR), inventors need to submit a patent application to the 
patent office, and have it granted by a patent examiner with expertise in the given technical 
domain.  
Prior findings on search for knowledge combination are limited to the knowledge landscape, 
characterized by the patents granted at the end of examination processes. Yet the patent 
examination process is hardly a one-shot decision by the examiner. Most applications (86.4%) 
fail on the first try (Carley et al. 2015). Additionally, the examination process can take 
significant time—an average of 3.2 years (Farre-Mmensa et al. 2018). At the heart of the process 
is the examiner’s significant scrutiny of the inventor’s claims. This scrutiny can involve several 
rounds of rejection (Williams 2017). Thus, it becomes important to understand the effect of 
examiners’ feedback, when rejecting claims, on the outcomes of inventors’ future patent 
applications. 
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This study takes an initial step to address this issue by considering the history of the inventor 
with respect to the feedback from patent examiners. By focusing on patent applications related to 
digital innovation—specifically, in communication, hardware and software, computer 
peripherals, information storage, and business methods—I aim to answer: Does the examiners’ 
feedback affects the outcome of an inventor’s future patent application for digital innovation and 
if so, how? 
Patent Examination Process and Outcome2 
In the United States, the patent examination process begins when an inventor submits an 
application to the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The application then goes through 
the pre-examination process to ensure that all necessary information is included. A complete 
application has two key sections: (a) a description of the invention that includes all citations to 
prior patent documents and scientific and commercial literature and (b) a list of the inventor’s 
claims for IPR. As a part of the pre-examination, the application is assigned to a patent examiner 
with expertise in the invention’s technical domain.  
In compliance with US Code Title 35 (35 U.S.C.),3 the examiner is required to conduct two types 
of evaluation of the claims: 
Procedural evaluation. The examiner will make sure that the claims are directed to patent-
eligible subject matter (35 U.S.C. Section 101), that the description of inventions satisfies the 
disclosure requirements, and that the claims clearly define the invention (35 U.S.C. Section 112).  
Innovativeness evaluation. The examiner will look for prior art (i.e., patent documents or other 
nonpatent literature) to determine whether the invention is novel—that is, not anticipated by 
                                                             
2 Please refer to Graham et al. (2018) for a comprehensive description of the patent examination process. 
3 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/consolidated_laws.pdf. 
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prior art (35 U.S.C. Section 102)—and nonobvious—that is, sufficiently different from what has 
been described in the prior art (35 U.S.C. Section 103). 
Based on these evaluations, the examiner may allow all claims and the inventor can be granted a 
patent. However, in most cases, the examiner sends the inventor an office action that rejects one 
or more claims, based on her procedural and innovativeness evaluations. USPTO recommends 
that examiners use office action templates with standardized headings and custom form 
paragraphs to render documents consistent, easy to read, and legally proper. Standardized 
headings and form paragraphs provide legal terms and definitions relevant to the objections 
and/or rejections being raised (Lu et al. 2017). 
Figures 1–3 provide three examples of claim rejections for different reasons. The rejection in 
Figure 1 is based on the procedural evaluation; claims 1–8 and 10 are not patent-eligible subject 
matter. The rejection in Figure 2 is based on the innovativeness evaluation; claims 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 
11, 12, and 13 lack novelty since they are anticipated by prior patent document US 
2005/0169483. Similarly, in Figure 3, claims 1–19 are obvious to patent document USPN 
2008/147642.  
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Figure 1. 
Claim Rejection: Nonpatentable Subject Matter 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
Claim Rejection: Lack of Novelty 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
Claim Rejection: Obviousness 
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Upon receiving the examiner’s feedback, the inventor generally has three months to decide 
whether to submit a response along with a list of revised claims or just abandon the application. 
If the inventor chooses to continue the examination process, the examiner will evaluate the 
revised claims to determine whether the rejections have been overcome. If no issue remains, the 
inventor will be notified that the claims are allowable. Otherwise, the examiner may find that the 
inventor’s arguments are insufficient to overcome the rejections or that her revised claims raise 
further issues and therefore send her another office action.  
In most cases, patent examination is an iterative process with several rounds of rejection and 
revision. Even though the inventor can always submit a response to a rejection, she presumably 
chooses between “revise and resubmit” and “abandon” by considering the tradeoff between costs 
and benefits: If a successful revision would result in a patent too narrow to provide much 
economic value, the inventor would likely abandon the application.  
The patent examination process provides rich indicators at different levels from a variety of 
perspectives with which to evaluate how an inventor performs in her application for IPR:  
• Number of claims (total, procedural, innovativeness) rejected by round 
• Number of claims (total, procedural, innovativeness) rejected by application 
• Number of rounds in an application 
• Application granted or not 
An example. Amazon’s Alexa is a virtual assistant, which users can activate with a wake-word 
such as “Alexa.” Figure 4 is a patent application (13/929,540, “Detecting Self-Generated Wake 
Expression”) related to this technology. Although Amazon submitted this application on June 27, 
2013, it was not granted until August 29, 2017. Table 1 tabulates the complete four-round 
examination process. 
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Figure 4. 
Amazon’s Patent Application: “Detecting Self-Generated Wake Expression” 
 
 
 
Table 1.  
Examination Process of Patent Application 13/929,540 
 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 
Inventor  
submission date June 2013 March 2016 August 2016 December 2016 
Examiner  
office action date December 2015 May 2016 September 2016 
Patent granted in 
August 2017 
# claim rejections (total) 20 19 9 - 
# claim rejections  
(procedural evaluation) 20 19 9 - 
# claim rejections 
(innovativeness evaluation) 20 19 9 - 
# references in 
innovativeness rejection 
2 3 3 - 
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Inventor Learning from Examiner Feedback 
Literature using archival data largely finds evidence of learning from failure in different 
scenarios at different level of analysis. Riedl and Seidel (2018), studying T-shirt design contests, 
find that participants can improve their performance by observing others’ failures. Madsen and 
Desai (2010) find evidence that a future satellite launch is more likely to succeed with a greater 
number of failed launches. Both Audia and Goncalo (2007) and Baum and Dahlin (2007) 
provide empirical evidence that cumulative past success drives organizations’ local search for 
minor performance improvements and that, as the number of failures increases, organizations 
tend to search beyond their knowledge boundaries for new ideas.  
In rejecting an inventor’s claim for lack of innovativeness, the examiner cites the relevant prior 
art. Such feedback, however, is not only useful for administrative purposes. USPTO patent 
examiners are required to have a science or engineering background and expertise in a specific 
technology field (Righi and Simcoe 2019); they tend to have this role at USPTO for an average 
of 10 years.4 By learning from such expert feedback, the inventor can ease the “burden of 
knowledge” and enrich her own knowledge landscape, which generates more opportunities for 
her to search for successful combination of previously disconnected ideas (Jones 2009). She also 
becomes better positioned to survive future patent examinations.  
The influence of examiners’ feedback is subject to the temporal and technological scope of that 
feedback. While feedback pointing to recent and domain-concentrated knowledge can enrich the 
inventor’s knowledge landscape, it only facilitates local search in the smooth, correlated 
knowledge landscape in which the inventor moves across adjacent positions, which results in 
                                                             
4 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml. 
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incremental inventions (Fleming 2001). In contrast, feedback linked to temporally distant 
knowledge and to knowledge in diverse technology fields prevents the inventor from being 
trapped on a local peak in the knowledge landscape and helps her move across jumbled and 
uncorrelated positions, results in novel knowledge combinations and inventions (Fleming 2001).    
Therefore, I expect that (a) examiners’ feedback can help the inventor survive future patent 
applications for digital innovation and (b) she is more likely to generate successful patent 
applications when the feedback is linked to temporally distant knowledge and to knowledge in 
diverse technology fields. 
Research Design 
Data 
I conduct the analysis at two levels: inventor-application-round and inventor-application. I 
construct the dataset regarding digital innovation from publicly available datasets on the USPTO 
Chief Economist Office website.  
Office action data. I use the recently released USPTO Office Action Dataset for Patents,5 which 
uses machine learning to systematically extract office action information issued in 2008–2017 
from image files for publicly available utility patent applications via the USPTO Public Patent 
Application Information Retrieval system. Specifically, this dataset enables me to extract which 
claim is rejected for what reason—procedural or innovativeness. It also includes the relevant 
prior art which the examiner uses to reject an inventor’s claim for lack of innovativeness. 
                                                             
5 Please refer to Lu et al. (2017) for a comprehensive description of this dataset. 
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Patent examination data. To extract the information in each office action, I use the USPTO 
Patent Examination Research Dataset, which provides a wealth of microlevel administrative data 
on US patents, patent applications, and their examination histories. 
Patent application data. I use the USPTO PatentsView platform—a new database that 
longitudinally links inventors and their organizations, locations, and overall patenting activity—
to collect all granted and nongranted utility patent information (e.g., application date, grant date, 
inventor name, inventor gender, inventor affiliation, lawyer information, and patent 
classification). Based on the NBER patent classification (Hall 2001 and PatentsView), I select 
patent applications that fall into the categories of digital innovation: communication, hardware 
and software, computer peripherals, information storage, and business methods (such as fintech 
and machine learning algorithms). I then link the corresponding office action information to 
these patents. In addition, for each patent cited in the office action with respect to innovativeness 
evaluation, I identify relevant information from PatentsView. 
After merging all data with the office actions regarding digital innovation in 2008–2017, I obtain 
two levels of samples. For the inventor-application-round–level analysis, I obtain 59,380 
observations from 9,888 inventors who have gone through at least two rounds in the patent 
examination process and whose first application is included in the sample. For the inventor-
application–level analysis, I extract 25, 203 observations from 7,451 inventors who have 
submitted at least two applications and whose first application is contained in the sample. Tables 
2 and 3 provide descriptive information of the sample at these two levels. 
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Methods 
Baseline model specification. To investigate how examiners’ feedback regarding claim 
innovativeness affects an inventor’s future patent examination outcomes, I construct two baseline 
models: one at the inventor-application-round level and one at the inventor-application level.    
!"#$%_'()_*+,-. = 0 + 	34 × 6789++7_'()_*+,-.:4 
 +	3; × 678<(%=>?7=(_*+,-.:4 + 3@ × 678<(?ℎ>?7=(_*+,-.:4 
 +	3B × 678<(%=>?7=(_*+,-.:4 × 6789++7_'()_*+,-.:4	 
 +	3C × 678<(?ℎ>?7=(_*+,-.:4 × 6789++7_'()_*+,-.:4 
 +	!7+D*7"E	 +	F-.,                                                         … Equation (1) 
where i denotes inventor and t denotes the time when the office action for the focal application-
round is sent from the examiner. All variables are at the inventor-application-round level. Table 
2 provides definitions of the variables. As Claim_Rej_rndit is a count variable, I use negative 
binomial and Poisson model specifications. 
G_H#*$#I"(-. = 0 + 	34 × 6789++7_'()_#==-.:4 
 +	3; × 678<(%=>?7=(_#==-.:4 + 3@ × 678<(?ℎ>?7=(_#==-.:4 
 +	3B × 678<(%=>?7=(_#==-.:4 × 6789++7_'()_#==-.:4	 
 +	3C × 678<(?ℎ>?7=(_#==-.:4 × 6789++7_'()_#==-.:4 
 +	!7+D*7"E	 +	F-. ,                                                               … Equation (2) 
where i denotes inventor and t denote the time when the last office action for the focal 
application was sent. All variables are on the inventor-application level. Dependent variables are 
Claim_Rej_appit, Round_appit, and Grant_appit. Table 3 provides definitions of the variables. I 
use a Poisson model specification when the dependent variable is Claim_Rej_appit or 
Round_appit and a Probit model specification when the dependent variable is Grant_appit.
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Table 2.  
Level of Analysis: Inventor-Application-Round 
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
Claim_Rej_rnd Number of claims rejected by the examiner in the focal inventor-application-round at time t 23.53 17.01 
Inno_Rej_rnd Inventor’s number of innovativeness claim rejections at time t-1 377.33 642.91 
TempScope_rnd 
For all patents cited by examiners related to innovativeness in the office action for the focal inventor 
before t, calculate the average difference (in years) between the filing date of the cited patent and the mail 
date of the office action in which the focal patent is cited 
7.96 2.52 
TechScope_rnd 
For all patents cited by examiners related to innovativeness in the office action for the focal inventor 
before t, calculate the Herfindahl index based on each cited patent’s NBER subtechnology class. 1 
represents the most concentrated case and 0 represents the most diverse case. 
0.83 0.14 
Proce_Rej_rnd Inventor’s number of procedural claim rejections at time t-1 158.94 287.18 
Inventor_Patent Inventor’s number of granted patents at time t-1 9.00 17.88 
Examiner_Patent Examiner’s number of granted patents at time t-1 230.25 358.25 
Lawyer_Patent Lawyer’s number of granted patents at time t-1. If there is more than 1 lawyer in the focal patent application, I average their numbers of patents. 2819.6 6301.14 
Inventor_Affiliation 1 if the focal inventor is affiliated with an organization, 0 otherwise 0.99 0.02 
Inventor_Male 1 if the focal inventor is male, 0 otherwise 0.86 0.35 
Invention_Team 1 if the focal inventor has at least one collaborator, 0 otherwise 0.51 0.50 
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Table 3.  
Level of Analysis: Inventor-Application 
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
Claim_Rej_app Number of claims rejected by the examiner in the focal inventor-application at time t 42.45 39.11 
Round_app Number of rounds the focal inventor has gone through for the focal inventor-application at time t 3.22 1.45 
Grant_app 1 if the focal patent has been granted at time t, 0 otherwise 0.77 0.42 
Inno_Rej_app Inventor’s number of innovativeness claim rejections at time t-1 229.24 395.55 
TempScope_app 
For all patents cited by examiners related to innovativeness in the office action for the focal inventor 
before t, calculate the average difference (in years) between the filing date of the cited patent and the mail 
date of the office action in which the focal patent is cited 
7.86 2.80 
TechScope_app 
For all patents cited by examiners related to innovativeness in the office action for the focal inventor 
before t, calculate the Herfindahl index based on each cited patent’s NBER subtechnology class. 1 
represents the most concentrated case and 0 represents the most diverse case. 
0.82 0.17 
Proce_Rej_app Inventor’s number of procedural claim rejections at time t-1 122.67 219.96 
Inventor_Patent Inventor’s number of granted patents at time t-1 9.09 16.74 
Examiner_Patent Examiner’s number of granted patents at time t-1 309.92 424.16 
Lawyer_Patent Lawyer’s number of granted patents at time t-1. If there is more than 1 lawyer in the focal patent application, I average their numbers of patents. 3082.26 6456.43 
Inventor_Affiliation 1 if the focal inventor is affiliated with an organization, 0 otherwise 0.99 0.02 
Inventor_Male 1 if the focal inventor is male, 0 otherwise 0.87 0.34 
Invention_Team 1 if the focal inventor has at least one collaborator, 0 otherwise 0.55 0.50 
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Controls. As I am interested in the impact of innovativeness feedback, I control for procedural 
rejections. For inventors, I include their gender and affiliation as control variables. I also control 
for the characteristics of other stakeholders (such as collaborators, examiners, and lawyers). To 
rule out the heterogeneity between rounds in a focal patent application, I control for round 
number. I also include technology fixed effects based on digital innovation categories 
(communication, hardware and software, computer peripherals, information storage, and 
business methods) to tease out the heterogeneity among these technologies. I include year fixed 
effects to control for time-variant factors affecting all patent applications. 
Instrument variable. A potential problem of the baseline models is that they are subject to 
omitted variables, such as the inventor’s ability. Since that inventor characteristic is negatively 
related to both Claim_Rej_rnd and LogInno_Rej_rnd in Equation (1), I would expect to see a 
positive relationship between the two variables (i.e., !">0). To address this concern, I leverage 
the focal inventor’s previous collaborators who (a) have also worked with other inventors and (b) 
are not involved in the focal patent application. Based on innovativeness claim rejection 
information for these collaborators, I construct instrument variables for LogInno_Rej_rnd, 
LogTempScope_rnd, LogTechScope_rnd, LogInno_Rej_app, LogTempScope_app, and 
LogTechScope_app. The intuition is that these instrument variables are related to my variables of 
interest for the focal inventor due to past collaboration. But they are less likely to affect the 
outcome of the focal application as these collaborators are not involved in it and because their 
work with other inventors accounts for an average of 70% of their past patent applications (see 
Table 4 for details). 
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Table 4.  
Validity of Using Collaborators’ Claim Rejection Information as Instruments 
 
Statistics Round Application 
# inventors in the sample 9,888 7,451 
# collaborators for the focal inventors 25,663 22,238 
For each collaborator: 
Average # patent applications 10.6 10.8 
Average # patent applications with the focal inventor 3.1 3.2 
Average # patent applications with other inventors 7.5 7.6 
 
Results 
Round level. I first explore whether examiners’ feedback can help the inventor survive future 
patent applications for digital innovation. The negative binomial and Poisson results (Table 5) 
indicate that the relationship between Claim_Rej_rnd and LogInno_Rej_rnd is positive. Because, 
as I discussed in the methods section, this could be due to endogeneity, I implement instrument 
variables in Equation (1). This time, I find that the cumulative innovativeness feedback an 
inventor received from examiners is negatively associated (-0.966, z=-4.93, p<0.001) with her 
number of claim rejections in the next round of patent examination. In addition, such benefits are 
subject to the temporal (-0.237, z=-4.96, p<0.001) and technological (1.016, z=4.84, p<0.001) 
scope of the feedback. As expected, the inventor benefits more when the feedback is linked to 
temporally distant knowledge and to knowledge across diverse technology fields. 
Application level. I use similar instrument variables to conduct application-level analysis based 
on Equation (2). Consistent with the results in the round-level analysis, the cumulative 
innovativeness feedback an inventor received from examiners is negatively associated (-1.046, 
z=-2.49, p<0.05 in Table 6) with her number of claim rejections in the next round of patent 
application. Again, this benefit is contingent on the temporal (-0.379, z=-3.45, p<0.001) and 
technological (1.139, z=2.74, p<0.01) scope of the feedback. In addition to number of claims 
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rejected in the next patent application, I am interested in whether the inventor goes through fewer 
rounds and is more likely to have her patent granted when she learns from the innovativeness 
feedback. The results reported in Table 6 support this point.  
To sum up, the analysis provides consistent evidence that innovativeness feedback from patent 
examiners helps an inventor survive future patent applications. She benefits more from feedback 
linked to temporally distant knowledge and to knowledge across diverse technology fields. 
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Table 5. 
Inventor-Application-Round Analysis of Effect of Examiner’s Feedback on  
the Outcome of an Inventor’s Next Patent Application for Digital Innovation 
 
 DV=Claim_Rej_rnd 
Variable Negative binomial Poisson IV Poisson 
LogInno_Rej_rnd 0.0590* 0.0464*** -0.966*** 
 (2.43) (5.14) (-4.93) 
LogTempScope_rnd 0.139*** 0.129*** 1.287*** 
 (4.02) (9.82) (5.10) 
LogTechScope_rnd -0.412*** -0.500*** -5.512*** 
 (-3.56) (-11.37) (-4.58) 
LogTempScope_rnd * LogInno_Rej_rnd -0.00845 -0.00744** -0.237*** 
 (-1.14) (-2.70) (-4.96) 
LogTechScope_rnd * LogInno_Rej_rnd 0.0415+ 0.0614*** 1.016*** 
 (1.67) (6.56) (4.84) 
LogProce_Rej_rnd 0.0379*** 0.0386*** 0.0877*** 
 (13.50) (35.83) (6.55) 
LogInventor_Patent -0.0886*** -0.0872*** -0.156*** 
 (-26.10) (-71.77) (-25.04) 
LogExaminer_Patent 0.0317*** 0.0323*** 0.0520*** 
 (19.86) (55.18) (21.58) 
LogLawyer_Patent 0.000332 0.000586+ 0.00664*** 
 (0.37) (1.77) (5.86) 
Inventor_Affiliation 0.00260 0.00633 -0.227 
 (0.02) (0.13) (-1.54) 
Inventor_Male 0.0300*** 0.0386*** 0.0473*** 
 (4.49) (15.72) (5.94) 
Invention_Team 0.0467*** 0.0427*** 0.0420*** 
 (9.52) (23.91) (6.92) 
Class_Communication 
Baseline  
Class_Hardware&Software 0.0169** 0.00991*** 0.0244** 
 (2.68) (4.33) (2.94) 
Class_Peripherials -0.127*** -0.132*** -0.0952*** 
 (-15.40) (-41.51) (-7.89) 
Class_Storage 0.0116 0.000679 0.0134 
 (1.39) (0.22) (1.38) 
Class_Business_Method 0.136*** 0.129*** 0.110*** 
 (18.11) (48.93) (10.40) 
Year FE Included 
Intercept 4.006*** 4.053*** 9.166*** 
 (20.60) (59.27) (8.21) 
N 59380 59380 59380 
Note: +p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 6. 
Inventor-Application Analysis of Effect of Examiner’s Feedback on  
the Outcome of an Inventor’s Next Patent Application for Digital Innovation 
 
Variable 
DV=Claim_Rej_app DV=Round_app DV=Grant_app 
IV Poisson IV Poisson IV Probit 
LogInno_Rej_rnd -1.046* -0.330+ 1.693+ 
 (-2.49) (-1.70) (1.88) 
LogTempScope_rnd 1.982*** 0.811*** -2.412* 
 (3.60) (3.65) (-2.55) 
LogTechScope_rnd -6.981** -1.448 2.686 
 (-3.12) (-1.39) (0.53) 
LogTempScope_rnd * LogInno_Rej_rnd -0.379*** -0.186*** 0.714*** 
 (-3.45) (-3.97) (3.52) 
LogTechScope_rnd * LogInno_Rej_rnd 1.139** 0.194 -0.832 
 (2.74) (0.96) (-0.83) 
LogProce_Rej_rnd 0.0712* 0.00958 -0.144* 
 (2.32) (0.69) (-2.30) 
LogInventor_Patent -0.351*** -0.133*** 0.487*** 
 (-21.51) (-17.56) (12.17) 
LogExaminer_Patent 0.103*** 0.0168*** 0.0758*** 
 (16.32) (6.25) (6.44) 
LogLawyer_Patent 0.0176*** 0.00812*** -0.00889 
 (6.51) (6.76) (-1.61) 
Inventor_Affiliation -0.571+ -0.273* -0.206 
 (-1.68) (-1.98) (-0.41) 
Inventor_Male 0.0629*** -0.00314 0.157*** 
 (3.37) (-0.38) (4.58) 
Invention_Team 0.00534 -0.0663*** 1.038*** 
 (0.41) (-11.51) (37.25) 
Class_Communication 
Baseline  
Class_Hardware&Software 0.0391* 0.0293*** -0.184*** 
 (2.36) (3.70) (-5.18) 
Class_Peripherials 0.00495 0.0762*** -0.270*** 
 (0.22) (7.45) (-6.46) 
Class_Storage 0.129*** 0.0968*** -0.0480 
 (6.25) (10.26) (-1.13) 
Class_Business_Method 0.187*** 0.127*** -0.565*** 
 (8.78) (12.70) (-12.63) 
Year FE Included 
Intercept 10.69*** 3.344*** -7.494+ 
 (4.63) (3.31) (-1.67) 
N 25203 25203 25129 
Note: +p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Discussion 
Conclusion. This study peers into the black box of digital patent examination by identifying the 
influence on an inventor’s future patenting outcomes of examiners’ feedback pertaining to why 
the claims of her past applications have been rejected. It provides consistent evidence that such 
feedback reduces the number of claims rejected, speeds up the examination process by reducing 
the number of examination rounds, and increases the probability of a patent being granted. 
Moreover, these benefits are subject to the temporal and technological scope of the feedback; 
with the amount of feedback increasing, an inventor benefits more from feedback linked to 
temporally distant knowledge and to knowledge across diverse technology fields. 
Contribution. This study contributes to the emerging literature on the production of digital 
innovation. It extends our understanding by integrating (a) the role of feedback from examiners 
to inventors on the innovativeness of their digital innovations and (b) the implications of that 
effect for the inventor’s digital innovation production. By incorporating the role of examiner 
feedback, this study extends the current IS literature, which has primarily focused on the role of 
digital technologies for knowledge search and for coordination. Specifically, the current 
literature provides evidence on how inventors can leverage their knowledge base to search for 
knowledge combination and how digital technology can help (e.g., Fleming 2001; Wu et al. 
forthcoming). This study, in contrast, introduces a key stakeholder—the patent examiner—into 
the inventor’s digital innovation production process. It specifically surfaces two key aspects of 
examiners’ feedback—temporal and technological—which help clarify how the inventor learns 
from the feedback. The results suggest that examiners’ feedback extending the temporal scope of 
knowledge considered by inventors is useful as it informs them on how to integrate temporally 
distant knowledge in formulating their claims for innovativeness and for knowledge 
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combination. Similarly, feedback that extends the inventors’ knowledge scope to other 
technological categories is useful as it informs them on how to combine knowledge across 
domains and develop innovative claims which are more likely to be granted in the patenting 
process.   
This study contributes to the body of work on (a) exploitation of established competencies 
through incremental adjustments and (b) exploration of new competencies and knowledge 
through radical innovation. The organization science and IS literatures have examined how 
exploitation tendencies in different domains can be countered through mechanisms that promote 
exploration (e.g., Durcikova et al. 2011; Im and Rai 2008; Levinthal and March 1993; March 
1991). I contribute to this discourse by integrating the role of an expert (the examiner) in 
challenging inventors’ myopia by orienting them toward knowledge that is more temporally 
distant and technological diverse. Through such reorientation of search, examiners can challenge 
the inventors’ exploitative tendencies to search for solutions in proximate and familiar 
knowledge domains. 
Past empirical work using patents to investigate digital innovation has relied on patents granted 
at the end of the examination process (e.g., Kleis et al. 2012).  I approach the digital innovation 
process at a granular level by focusing on intermediate rounds and assessments at the level of 
specific claims, allowing me to examine the role of examiner feedback at different levels of 
analysis—inventor-application-round and inventor-application—and using different outcome 
measures. This research design enables me to triangulate my findings across levels of analysis 
and measures pertaining to inventors’ production of digital innovation.   
In sum, the knowledge landscape an inventor searches for knowledge combination can be 
significantly influenced by examiners’ feedback. This study provides consistent evidence by 
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revealing the entire pipeline of the patent application process and characterizing examiners’ 
feedback as expanding the knowledge landscape in which inventors search for knowledge 
combination.  
This study informs a debate among scholars regarding the expertise of patent examiners in digital 
patents (e.g., Burk and Lemley 2003). As documented, inventors can leverage feedback from 
examiners to succeed in their future claims for IPR, especially when the feedback is related to 
distant knowledge and to knowledge across technology areas. This study also provides more 
granular evidence on whether citations added by examiners reflect the knowledge available to or 
used by inventors (e.g., Alcacer et al. 2009). While inventors may not use the knowledge 
embedded in the feedback (i.e., citations) for the focal invention, it could enrich the knowledge 
landscape in which they search for knowledge combination in the future. Thus, this study 
suggests that it is necessary to adopt a temporal perspective to differentiate the value of 
examiners’ citations.   
Limitations and future research. My results indicate that inventors benefit from examiners’ 
feedback for their future applications, but do not provide empirical evidence of the underlying 
mechanism. Therefore, certain open questions deserve further exploration. For instance, because 
an attorney handles the inventor’s communication with the examiner, it is crucial to understand 
(a) whether the inventor actually reads the examiner’s feedback and, if so, to what extent the 
knowledge flows to the inventor rather than to the attorney, and (b) whether the feedback 
changes the inventor’s behavior of generating novel knowledge combination. An alternative 
explanation is that inventors are already aware of the prior art cited by the examiner, but do not 
include it in the application, hoping to gain a broader claim scope. In this case, the role of the 
examiner’s feedback is to restrict such gaming. Future research can provide more nuanced 
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evidence of whether and how examiners’ feedback enables inventors to generate novel 
inventions. 
During past decades, reliance on teamwork has increased, fundamentally shifting the innovation 
process (Fortunator et al. 2018; Wu et al. 2019; Wuchty et al. 2007). In this study, however, I 
focus only on the individual inventor while controlling for teamwork. An interesting finding is 
that teamwork does not seem to be helpful in the survival of the patent application through the 
examination process. This is inconsistent with the past evidence that collaboration can filter out 
bad ideas and make brilliant ideas stand out (Singh and Fleming 2010). Such evidence, however, 
is based only on the inventor’s knowledge base without considering feedback from examiners. 
Future research can address this puzzle by (a) characterizing an inventor’s expertise based on her 
own knowledge base and on the feedback from examiners and (b) exploring how collaborators 
interact—based on the expertise from these two sources—in search of knowledge combinations. 
While differences across the specific types of digital patent (communication, hardware and 
software, computer peripherals, information storage, and business methods) is not the focus of 
this study, the fixed-effect results indicate that patents involving hardware/software and business 
models are less likely to survive the patent examination process than patents in the other three 
categories. This raises an intriguing question for both scholars and policy makers: Is the 
difference due to too many incremental patent applications saturating hardware/software and 
business methods or to examiners’ lack of expertise in these two categories? Future research can 
consider both the innovativeness of inventors’ claims and the examiners’ capabilities to explore 
the underlying mechanism that leads to the difference. 
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Essay 2 
 
Innovating in the IT Industry:  
Mandatory Patent Disclosure and the Formation of Patent Thickets 
 
 
Abstract 
This study aims to understand of the formation of patent thickets in the IT industry. Specifically, 
what is the underlying mechanism that establishes the intellectual property rights (IPR) overlap 
among IT firms that may restrict their commercialization of their own inventions? With the 
enactment of the American Inventor’s Protection Act (AIPA) in 2000, a firm is required to 
publicly disclose a patent application 18 months after the filing day. This study outlines two 
competing predictions on how such pre-grant patent disclosure will affect an IT firm’s IPR 
overlap with its competitors: (a) a constraining influence due to patent examiners’ evaluation 
taking the pre-grant disclosures into account while assessing competitors’ patent claims and (b) 
knowledge spillover when technical information and market signals are revealed to competitors. 
To evaluate these competing explanations, I exploit the natural experiment of the enactment of 
AIPA. I find that the knowledge spillover effect dominates, especially when the technological 
and market values of the disclosure are high. Moreover, the knowledge spillover effect is more 
pronounced when the focal IT firm and its competitors are close in technology space and product 
market. This study reveals the innovation interdependency among IT firms in terms of IPR and 
uncovers the underlying mechanism by which it evolves. Thus, it provides more nuanced 
evidence of the dynamics of innovation in the IT industry. 
 
Keywords: Patent disclosure, patent thicket, intellectual property rights overlap,   
 IT industry, innovation, commercialization  
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Research Problem Formulation 
In recent years, there has been an outbreak of wars over digital patents. In the smartphone 
industry, for example, major vendors haven been enforcing patents against competitors (see 
Figure 1) since 2009.6 On May 24, 2018, a jury awarded Apple $539 million for damages, seven 
years after the start of its patent battle with Samsung over key components of their smartphones.7 
With IT firms racing to assemble patent portfolios and develop digital products and services in 
new technology fields such as autonomous cars, augmented reality, smart devices, blockchain, 
and artificial intelligence, we can expect even bigger patent wars in the next few decades. 
The emergence of such patent wars is a result of technology convergence in a single digital 
product or service which involves a myriad of hardware and software patents (Graham and 
Vishnubhakat 2013). For example, “the number of patents in a smartphone is so huge that 
nobody has ever been able to count,” says Florian Mueller, founder of the FOSS Patents blog and 
an intellectual property activist. “Besides, you’d have to look not only at smartphone patents but 
also hundreds of thousands or millions of software patents.”8 Therefore, commercializing a 
smartphone without rights to use all relevant patents can lead to infringement claims. 
The problem of patent thickets has inspired a growing concern among scholars and policy 
makers that patent rights are themselves becoming an impediment—rather than an incentive—to 
innovation (Federal Trade Commission 2012; Galasso and Schankerman 2015). For instance, 
patent thickets can hold up innovations (Bessen and Meurer 2013), increase the complexity of 
license negotiations (Wen and Forman 2016), increase litigation (Bessen and Meurer 2013), and  
                                                             
6 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.economist.com/business/2010/10/21/the-great-patent-battle. 
7 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-24/apple-wins-539-million-from-
samsung-in-damages-retrial. 
8 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.wired.co.uk/article/apple-samsung-iphone-patents. 
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Figure 1 
Patent Wars in the Smartphone Industry 
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create incentives to add more—but often weaker—patents to the patent system (Allison et al. 
2015). The increased transaction costs associated with patent thickets reduce profits from the 
commercialization of innovation, thus working as a barrier to entry into technology sectors (Hall 
et al. 2017; Cockburn and MacGarvie 2011; Wen et al. 2015), and ultimately reduce innovation 
incentive (Hall et al. 2017) and business dynamism (Akcigit et al. 2018). 
To mitigate the patent thickets problem, firms rely on multi-firm institutional arrangements such 
as patent pools (e.g., Via LTE9), standard-setting organizations (e.g., 3rd Generation Partnership 
Project10), and cross-licensing, which lowers the transaction costs of identifying and negotiating 
patent licensing agreements for related technologies. However, such cooperative mechanisms 
have limitations. For example, while patent pools are predicted to address patent thickets (Lerner 
and Tirole 2004), they can create another problem by shifting innovation toward improving an 
inferior substitute for the pool (Lampe and Moser 2013). Besides, the sustainability of these 
cooperative mechanisms is questionable. IT-intensive industries evolve rapidly and are often 
dominated by a few players (Bessen 2017); cooperation is therefore likely to break down as 
dominant players convert their patent portfolios into weapons to eliminate competition (Shaver 
2012). 
The current scholarly conversation on patent thickets mainly focuses on their adverse effects on 
innovation and on potential solutions. However, we still have limited understanding of the 
micro-foundation with regard to the formation of patent thickets in the IT industry. Specifically, 
what underlying mechanism establishes the IPR overlap that may restrict a firm’s 
commercialization of its own invention? With the enactment of the American Inventor’s 
                                                             
9 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from http://www.via-corp.com/us/en/licensing/lte/overview.html. 
10 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.3gpp.org. 
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Protection Act (AIPA) in 2000, a firm is required to publicly disclose a patent application 18 
months after the filing day. On the one hand, such disclosure can generate visible prior art in the 
patent examination process that is likely to compromise the novelty of patent applications from 
competitors, pre-empting them from holding patents in the focal firm’s fields of interest and thus 
reducing IPR overlap (Guellec et al. 2012). On the other hand, knowledge spillover due to the 
disclosure can stimulate competitors to innovate in the same domain (Bloom et al. 2013). One 
can then expect more IPR overlap.   
I aim to resolve these competing predictions in the context of IT industry. More formally, I ask: 
Does the disclosure of patent information by an IT firm affect the IPR overlap with peers that 
may restrict its commercialization of its own inventions and, if so, how? I answer by leveraging 
the natural experiment arising from the enactment of AIPA, which I discuss next. 
The American Inventor’s Protection Act 
To facilitate technology diffusion, reduce duplicative research, and promote innovation, the 
American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999 came into effect on November 29, 2000, requiring 
public disclosure of a patent application 18 months after the filing day, even if the patent has not 
yet been granted.11 Patent applicants had previously been allowed to keep their applications 
secret until the patent was granted, which took on average 38 months (Graham and Hegde 2015), 
so this law was  a significant advance in the disclosure of firms’ innovative activities, as 
summarized in Figure 2. 
                                                             
11 All US patent applications with foreign parallel applications (filed in the EU or Japan, for example) must be 
published 18 months after the first application, whereas inventors filing patents only in the US can opt out of the 18-
month disclosure requirement by submitting a nonpublication request to the USPTO. This request can be withdrawn 
during the patent examination process, but a disclosure decision cannot be. According to Graham and Hegde (2015), 
for 10% of US patents in the computer and communication fields filed between November 29, 2000 and the end of 
2005, the applicants opted out. 
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Figure 2.  
Summary of Disclosure Change Due to AIPA  
 
Pre-AIPA: Patents filed before November 29, 2000 
 
 
Post-AIPA: Patents filed on or after November 29, 2000 
 
The published patent applications are posted in the USPTO Patent Application Full-Text and 
Image Database12 every Thursday. The entire patent document is available to the public through 
this database, including a detailed description of the invention, the technological claims that define 
its scope, and technical drawings that illustrate its mechanisms. Figure 3 provides an example of a 
pre-grant disclosure of an invention (Pub. No. US2015/0006176) by Amazon that allows users to 
activate Alexa using a wake-word such as “Alexa.” 
Patent Disclosure and IPR Overlap 
I outline two competing explanations of how patent disclosure will affect the IPR overlap: (a) a 
constraining influence due to patent examiners’ evaluations that take the focal firm’s pre-grant 
disclosures into account while assessing competitors’ patent claims and (b) knowledge spillover 
due to technical information and market signals being revealed to competitors.  I identify two 
sources of heterogeneity affecting the spillover and consequently the IPR overlap: (a) the value 
(technological and market) of the focal firm’s pre-disclosure and (b) closeness (technological and 
market) between the focal IT firm and its competitors.   
                                                             
12 http://appft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html. 
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Figure 3.  
Amazon’s Patent Application: “Detecting Self-Generated Wake Expression”13 
 
 
                                                             
13 Retrieved on May 1, 2019, from https://patents.google.com/patent/US20150006176A1/en?oq=us20150006176. 
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During the patent examination process, an examiner will look for prior art to determine whether 
the application’s claims are novel and nonobvious. The pre-grant disclosure increases the search 
space for an examiner to identify prior art and use it as the basis to reject claims in competitors’ 
applications. Given such feedback, the competitors have to decide whether to revise the scope of 
their claims or abandon the application. If a revision accommodating the examiner’s feedback 
would result in a patent that, even if granted, would be too narrow to provide much economic 
value, the competitors would likely abandon the application. Competitors will thus be pre-
empted from holding patents in the fields in which the focal firm has provided pre-grant 
disclosure, which will reduce IPR overlap. 
The disclosed patent information is valuable not only in helping the patent examiner evaluate 
claims in competitors’ applications, but also in providing technical information and signaling 
market opportunities to competitors. The pre-grant disclosure contains highly disaggregated 
information on the focal firm’s investment in its innovation (Kim 2018), which can be quite 
relevant to the competitor’s inventions. For example, the Alexa patent mentioned above provides 
detailed technical information on how to build a smart speaker from different components, the 
application context of such a device, and how to leverage machine learning to understand natural 
language. Competitors such as Apple and Google may find such details useful in their own 
development of smart speakers. In addition, pre-grant disclosure can help competitors identify 
potential market opportunities. For instance, other IT firms may view the pre-grant disclosure of 
Amazon’s Alexa patent as a signal of the future market demand for virtual assistants and race to 
make their own R&D investments. Thus, the pre-grant disclosure can stimulate a firm’s 
competitors to innovate in the same domain and to target the same markets. As a result, I expect 
pre-grant disclosure to increase the IPR overlap between a firm and its peers.  
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The value of the pre-grant disclosure, however, is not homogeneous. There can be differences 
based on technological value, which is the extent to which the focal patent destabilizes the 
technological landscape (Funk and Owen-Smith 2017), and market value, which is the stock 
market reaction to the grant of focal patent (Kogan et al. 2017).  I suggest that because of these 
differences, the impacts of the disclosure will also be heterogeneous. Reverting to the 
explanation in which patent examiners’ search regarding competitors’ patent claims includes the 
focal firm’s pre-disclosures, the focal firm may file patents at the periphery of an important 
invention simply to limit the patenting of related inventions by competitors (Guellec et al. 2012). 
In this case, the disclosed information will provide only limited technological and market value 
to its competitors, who will be more likely to abandon their patent applications if the claims are 
rejected based on it, since the scope of their applications, if granted, would be too narrow to 
provide much economic value. Therefore, I expect the knowledge spillover effect to dominate 
when the pre-grant disclosure has high technological or market value. In particular, I expect an 
increase of IPR overlap between the focal firm and its peers when the technological or market 
value of the pre-grant application is high. 
Finally, I expect the knowledge spillover effect to be conditional on the closeness of competitors 
to the focal firm. I suggest that this closeness can be differentiated based on (a) the technological 
space in which the firms innovate and (b) the product markets in which they compete. My 
rationale for expecting closeness to affect the extent of knowledge spillover is grounded in an 
absorptive capacity perspective, emphasizing the receiver’s ability to recognize the value of new 
knowledge and to assimilate and apply it (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Malhotra et al. 2005). 
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Research Design 
Data 
To identify firms in the IT industry, I start with the four-digit North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) list in Pan et al. (forthcoming) and remove sub-industries that are 
not IPR-intensive, such as telecommunications resellers. Table 1 lists the 14 four-digit NACIS 
codes I use to construct the IT firm sample. The analysis is based on a firm-year-level integrated 
dataset constructed from the following datasets.  
Table 1. 
14 Four-digit NAICS IT Industry Sectors 
 
NAICS Industry  
3341 Computer and Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 
3342 Communications Equipment Manufacturing 
3343 Audio and Video Equipment Manufacturing 
3344 Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing 
3345 Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments Manufacturing 
3346 Manufacturing and Reproducing Magnetic and Optical Media 
5112 Software Publishers 
5171 Wired Telecommunications Carriers 
5172 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite) 
5174 Satellite Telecommunications 
5179 Other Telecommunications 
5182 Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services 
5191 Information Services 
5415 Computer Systems Design and Related Services 
 
Patent data. I use the USPTO PatentsView platform—a database that longitudinally links 
inventors and their organizations, locations, and overall patenting activity—to collect utility 
patents initially assigned to an IT firm at the time of grant for 1996–2005. Such patents are 
useful in the focal firm’s commercialization of a related technology. I complement each patent 
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with its technological and market values via the datasets compiled by Kogan et al. (2017) and 
Funk and Owen-Smith (2017). 
Financial data. I obtain firms’ financial and accounting metrics for 1996–2005 from the 
Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database, which includes 99,000 global securities—covering 
99% of the world's total market capitalization—with annual company data history back to 1950. 
Merging all 1996–2005 data, I obtain an unbalance panel of data with 5,796 firm-year 
observations from 1,030 firms. Table 2 provides descriptive information of the sample. Of the 
sampled firms, 566 had their first pre-grant disclosure in 2001, 160 in 2002, 51 in 2003, 50 in 
2004, and 28 in 2005. Such staggered phase-in of the 18-month rule helps to rule out the 
possibility that an observed change in a focal IT firm’s IPR overlap with its peers is a result of 
other concurrent changes; it is highly unlikely that other concurrent changes follow the same 
staggered pattern and that a IT firm’s exposure to them correlates with its patenting intensity 
(Hegde et al. 2018).  
Methods 
Firm IPR overlap. To characterize a focal IT firm’s IPR overlap with its peers, I adopt the idea 
of the patent claim overlap measure recently developed by USPTO economists (deGrazia et al. 
forthcoming), which I briefly describe below. 
As indicated in Figure 4, a triad is defined based on citations among three granted patents—A, B, 
and C—each owned by a different firm. Each citation carries a weight determined by the textual 
similarity of the patent claims in the citing and cited patents. Wab, for example, is the weight 
measured by the claim similarity of patents A and B. The citation weights are then summed 
(Wab+Wac+Wbc) to represent the overall claim overlap between one patent and the other two.  
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Table 2.  
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
Overlap Focal firm’s IPR overlap with its peers in year t+1 that may restrict the commercialization of its inventions  0.23 1.05 
DisDummy Equals 1 when the focal firm has its first pre-grant disclosure and then remains 1 until the end of the sample period 0.28 0.45 
DisNum Number of patents the focal firm discloses in year t 12.40 70.00 
DisMV Total market value ($million) of patents disclosed by the focal firm in year t 65.60 369.58 
DisTV Total technological value of patents disclosed by the focal firm in year t 52.80 86.09 
PClos Product market Mahalanobis closeness between the focal firm and its peers in IT industry in 1996–2005, standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 -0.01 1.01 
TClos Technological Mahalanobis closeness between the focal firm and other firms in IT industry in 1996–2005, standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 0.04 1.02 
RD R&D expenses scaled by total assets; 0 if R&D expenditures are missing 0.14 0.16 
CAPX Capital expenditures scaled by total assets 0.05 0.05 
Size Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets 4.89 2.23 
Lev Firm leverage as measured by the sum of short-term and long terms debt, scaled by total assets 0.17 0.31 
ROA Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets -0.18 0.59 
TobinQ Sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, scaled by total assets 2.86 3.80 
MB Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity 3.77 6.36 
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Figure 4 
Claim Overlap Calculation Based on a Triad 
Note: Each circle represents a patent; the link indicats a citation between two patents. 
 
 
The intuition of this overlap measure is that each of three firms owns a patent that is similar to 
those of the other two, which may restrict their commercialization of inventions. As discussed by 
von Graevenitz et al. (2011), the likelihood of resolving a mutually blocking relationship 
between any two firms in a triad depends on the actions of the third. Because the negotiation 
problem in a blocking triad cannot be resolved through independent bilateral negotiation, it is 
more difficult than in a bilateral relationship, which raises negotiation costs substantially. 
As I am interested in IPR overlap that may restrict a firm’s commercialization of its inventions, I 
focus on two types of triad established by its competitors, as indicated in Figure 5. Specifically, 
the focal firm owns patent A and patents B and C are each owned by a different competitor. In 
Panel A, patents B and C are linked to patent A as forward citations. The triad is established once 
patents B and C are granted. In Panel B, patent B is a backward citation of patent A and patent C 
is a forward citation of patent A. The triad is established once patent C is granted.  
For each firm-year in the sample, I first identify all triads, based on the patent citation 
information. To calculate the claim similarity for a patent pair, I leverage the term frequency-
inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) algorithm (Manning and Schutze 2008). Specifically, I 
transform all patent claims into a TF-IDF-weighted word frequency matrix, with each row 
representing claims in a focal patent and each column representing the number of times the 
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corresponding word appears in the claims for that patent. The intuition of the TF-IDF algorithm 
is to increase a word’s weight if it appears frequently in a focal patent’s claims and to decrease 
its weight if it also appears in other patents’ claims. The weight for each patent pair is the cosine 
similarity of its TF-IDF vector pair. Combining all three weights gives me the overall claim 
overlap between the focal firm and its two competitors for the focal triad. To measure the overall 
claim overlap at the firm-year level, I follow deGrazia et al. (2018), aggregating all triad-level 
overlap and normalizing it by the number of patents granted for the focal firm-year. 
Figure 5 
Patent Triads Used in This Study 
Note: Each circle represents a patent; the link indicates a citation between two patents. 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Econometric model specification. I use a generalized difference-in-differences (Betrand and 
Mullainathan 2003) based on the quasi-experiment of the enactment of AIPA. As indicated in 
Hegde et al. (2018), the de facto phase-in of the 18-month disclosure rule is staggered because 
firms applied for patents at different times after AIPA became effective, which allows me to 
sharpen my identification of the effect of pre-grant patent disclosures and to isolate it from the 
effects of other economic or regulatory changes. In addition, as mentioned in Kim (2018), firms 
didn’t necessarily anticipate AIPA’s passage, as it was strongly challenged by many individual 
inventors and even by 25 Nobel laureates in science and economics. This opposition led to many 
rounds of debate and amendments, causing considerable uncertainty as to whether the mandate 
would pass. Hence, firms were unlikely to have significantly adjusted their innovation decisions. 
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The baseline models are as follows: 
!"#$%&'()*+,-. = 0 + 	3. × 5'&)67&86+, +	9"86'"(+,	 + 	:+	 + 	;,	 + 	<+,                    … Equation (1) 
!"#$%&'()*+,-. = 0 + 	3. × =9(">+ × 	5'&)67&86+, + 	3? × 59(">+ × 	5'&)67&86+,	       
																																					+	9"86'"(+,	 + 	:+	 + 	;,	 + 	<+, ,                                                           … Equation (2) 
where i denotes firm and t denotes year. Treatment is my key variable of interest. As shown in 
Table 2, I construct four variables to indicate the phase-in of the 18-month disclosure rule. 
DisDummy is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the focal firm makes its first pre-grant 
disclosure and then remains 1 until the end of the sample period. DisNum is the number of 
disclosed pre-grant patents, which I use to measure the differential treatment effect of AIPA. 
DisMV is the total market value of patents disclosed. Specifically, for each disclosed patent, I 
identify its market value in Kogan et al.’s (2017) dataset, then aggregate the market value of all 
patents to the firm-year level.14 DisTV is the total technological value of patents disclosed. In 
particular, for each disclosed patent, I use Funk and Owen-Smith’s (2017) dataset to calculate the 
extent to which the focal patent destabilizes the technological landscape five years from the grant 
date, then aggregate the technological value of all patents to the firm-year level.15 For Equation 
(2), I interact the treatment variables with the closeness in product market and technology 
between the focal IT firm and its peers in the sample.  Specifically, for each firm, I follow Bloom 
et al. (2013) to calculate the product market (technological) Mahalanobis closeness by using the 
focal firm’s and its peers’ sales numbers (granted patent numbers) in different industries (patent 
technology classes) in 1996–2005.16 I also include a set of firm characteristics: R&D intensity 
(RD) and capital expenditures (CAPX) to capture the allocation of expenditure resources; firm 
                                                             
14 Please refer to Kogan et al. (2017) for the method of calculating the market value of patents. 
15 The advantage of Funk and Owen-Smith’s (2017) measure of technological value is that it distinguishes between 
inventions that are valuable because they reinforce the status quo and inventions that are valuable because they 
challenge it. Please refer to their paper for the method of calculating the technological value of patents. 
16 Please refer to Bloom et al. (2013) and Lucking et al. (2018) for detailed discussion on how to calculate these 
closeness measures. 
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size (Size) to control for operational scale; leverage (Lev) to control for potential constraints on 
investment budget; market-to-book ratio (MB) and TobinQ to control for potential long-term 
growth opportunities; and return on assets (ROA) to control for financial performance.  :+	 is a 
firm fixed effect, which controls for firm characteristics that do not vary over the sample period. 
;,	 is a year fixed effect, which absorbs aggregate shocks affecting all firms. In all specifications, 
I cluster the robust standard errors at the firm level. 
Results 
I winsorize the variables at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the impact of outliers. The findings 
based on Equation (1) are reported in Table 3. In Column 1, DisDummy is significantly positive 
(0.0409, t=4.07, p<0.001), indicating that the knowledge spillover effect dominates. That is, the 
knowledge disclosed from the focal IT firm’s pre-grant patents stimulates competitors to 
innovate in the same technology domain as the focal IT firm. To explicitly test the validity of the 
parallel trend assumption in the model specification, I follow Autor (2003) and use a multi-site 
entry difference-in-differences relative time model as shown below:  
!"#$%&'()*+, = 0 + 	3. × ∑ 3ABC>BD77E+,-A
F
AGHI +	9"86'"(+,	 + 	:+	 + 	;,	 + 	<+, ,     … Equation (3) 
where BC>BD77E+,-A is a dummy that equals 1 for observations in year t. Specifically, (a) for τ 
=0, year t is when the focal firm makes its first pre-grant disclosure; (b) for 0<τ<3, year t is τ 
years after; (c) for τ=3, year t is three or more years after; and (d) for τ <0, year t is |τ| years 
before the focal firm makes its first pre-grant disclosure. As shown in Figure 6, the coefficients 
of pre-treatment trends are all insignificant, showing the validity of using the untreated firms as 
controls. 
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Figure 6. 
Parallel Trend Test of Difference-in-Differences Model Specification 
 
 
Table 3. 
Effect of Pre-grant Disclosure on IPR Overlap 
 
 DV=LogOverlap(t+1) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DisDummy 0.0409***    
 (4.07)    
LogDisNum  0.0151***   
  (4.10)   
LogDisMV   0.0115***  
   (4.20)  
LogDisTV    0.00779*** 
    (4.07) 
LogRD -0.0173 -0.0149 -0.0135 -0.0172 
 (-0.40) (-0.34) (-0.31) (-0.40) 
LogCAPX -0.259*** -0.246*** -0.246*** -0.258*** 
 (-3.95) (-3.71) (-3.73) (-3.95) 
LogSize -0.0253*** -0.0247*** -0.0266*** -0.0253*** 
 (-3.69) (-3.62) (-3.91) (-3.69) 
LogLev -0.0209 -0.0198 -0.0186 -0.0208 
 (-0.85) (-0.81) (-0.77) (-0.85) 
ROA 0.00419 0.00490 0.00566 0.00421 
 (0.54) (0.63) (0.73) (0.54) 
LogTobinQ -0.0137+ -0.0124+ -0.0132+ -0.0137+ 
 (-1.85) (-1.68) (-1.78) (-1.85) 
MB 0.000631+ 0.000655+ 0.000717* 0.000633+ 
 (1.74) (1.83) (2.01) (1.75) 
Firm FE Included  
Year FE Included  
Intercept 0.191*** 0.186*** 0.195*** 0.191*** 
 (5.41) (5.30) (5.59) (5.40) 
N 5769 5769 5769 5769 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. t statistics in parentheses.  
         +p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** <0.001. 
51 
 
With this in mind, in Columns 2–4 of Table 3, I explore the differential effects of pre-grant 
disclosure from two perspectives: disclosure volume and disclosure value. In particular, the 
knowledge spillover effect is more pronounced when the disclosure volume (0.0151, t=4.10, 
p<0.001) is high. I also find that disclosed knowledge with high market value (0.0115, t=4.20, 
p<0.001) or high technological value (0.00779, t=4.07, p<0.001) stimulates competitors to 
innovate in the same technology domain as the focal firm. 
So far, my analysis focuses on the characteristics of pre-grant disclosure by the focal firm and 
the effects of that disclosure on IPR overlap. Next, I explore how competitors’ closeness to the 
focal firm with respect to technological space and product market affects the observed 
knowledge spillover effect. Columns 1–4 in Table 4 provide consistent evidence that a 
competitor’s absorptive capacity is important in assessing the disclosed knowledge from the 
focal firm and in assimilating that into its own knowledge base, which in turn facilitates 
innovation in the same technology domain as that of the focal firm. Interestingly, I find that the 
absorptive capacity arising from product market closeness is more important for the disclosed 
knowledge that would destabilize the current technology landscape in the next five years. Given 
the nature of such knowledge, competitors who are close in the product market with the focal 
firm would be more likely to assess the value of such knowledge and exploit it for product 
development. 
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Table 4. 
Effects of Product Market and Technological Closeness on Knowledge Spillover 
 
 DV=LogOverlap(t+1) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PClos*DisDummy 0.0127+    
 (1.70)    
TClos*DisDummy 0.0279***    
 (3.52)    
PClos* LogDisNum  0.00228   
  (0.86)   
TClos* LogDisNum  0.00562**   
  (2.97)   
PClos* LogDisMV   0.00112  
   (0.58)  
TClos* LogDisMV   0.00484***  
   (3.32)  
PClos* LogDisTV    0.00240+ 
    (1.69) 
TClos* LogDisTV    0.00523*** 
    (3.52) 
LogRD -0.0154 -0.0122 -0.0120 -0.0152 
 (-0.36) (-0.28) (-0.28) (-0.35) 
LogCAPX -0.241*** -0.249*** -0.248*** -0.241*** 
 (-3.76) (-3.86) (-3.82) (-3.75) 
LogSize -0.0223** -0.0218** -0.0224** -0.0223** 
 (-3.24) (-3.13) (-3.24) (-3.24) 
LogLev -0.0227 -0.0224 -0.0222 -0.0228 
 (-0.94) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.94) 
ROA 0.00421 0.00354 0.00403 0.00420 
 (0.54) (0.45) (0.52) (0.54) 
LogTobinQ -0.00960 -0.0119 -0.0121 -0.00965 
 (-1.31) (-1.61) (-1.63) (-1.31) 
MB 0.000606+ 0.000613+ 0.000651+ 0.000607+ 
 (1.65) (1.69) (1.81) (1.65) 
_Firm FE Included  
Year FE Included  
Intercept 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.175*** 0.171*** 
 (4.86) (4.84) (4.93) (4.86) 
N 5769 5769 5769 5769 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered by firm. t statistics in parentheses.  
         +p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** <0.001. 
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Discussion 
Conclusion. This study outlines two competing predictions of how a firm’s pre-grant patent 
disclosure will affect its IPR overlap with competitors: (a) a constraining influence due to patent 
examiners’ evaluations that take the pre-grant disclosures into account while assessing 
competitors’ patent claims and (b) knowledge spillover when technical information and market 
signals are revealed to competitors. The empirical evidence indicates that the knowledge 
spillover effect dominates—especially when the technological and market values of the 
disclosure are high—and is more pronounced when the competitors are close to the focal firm in 
technology space and product market.  
Contribution. This study contributes to the emerging scholarly conversation on the dynamics of 
innovation in the IT industry. The current literature provides evidence on how financing and 
product market competition can affect an IT firm’s innovation input (e.g., R&D spending) and 
output (e.g., number of patents granted) (Kim et al. 2016; Pan et al. forthcoming). This study, in 
contrast, reveals the innovation interdependency among IT firms in terms of IPR and uncovers 
the underlying mechanism by which such interdependency evolves. Thus, it provides more 
nuanced evidence of the dynamics of innovation in the IT industry. 
This study also enriches the understanding of patent thickets. The current conversation among 
economists, legal scholars, and policy makers mainly focuses on adverse effects and potential 
solutions. This study shifts that focus by examining the micro-foundation with regard to the 
formation of patent thickets in the IT industry. Specifically, it indicates that the knowledge 
spillover due to technical information and market signals being revealed to competitors via pre-
grant patent disclosure increases the focal IT firm’s overlapping IPR. That indicates that 
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disclosure is an important input into the optimal patent policy design in order to address patent 
thickets. 
Finally, I provide insights on the conditions under which the knowledge spillover effect—and 
consequently IPR overlap—are likely to be more pronounced.  Specifically, I find a duality of 
competitors’ motivation and capability explains the extent of IPR overlap. Competitors are more 
likely to pursue and patent similar digital innovations if the focal firm’s patent has high 
technological or market value and are more likely to be able to pursue similar innovations if they 
have the absorptive capacity to assess, assimilate, and exploit the knowledge underlying the 
disclosed patents. This absorptive capacity is likely to be greater when the competitors are in a 
similar technological space and product market.  
Limitation and future research. In this study, I focus on public firms in the IT industry to 
examine the formation of patent thickets. However, due to the increasing dependence of 
innovation on software, digital patents are increasingly important in industries well beyond the 
traditional definition of electronics and IT (Branstetter et al. 2018). One would therefore expect a 
cascading adverse effect of thickets of digital patents on traditional manufacturing industries 
such as automobiles, aerospace, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals. It would be interesting to 
explore how firms in non-IT sectors react to this threat and assemble their digital patent 
portfolios, which in turn may affect the dynamic of patent thicket formation for digital patents.  
Additionally, the share of young firms in economic activity has been on a secular decline since 
the 1980s (Decker et al. 2016; Furman and Orszag 2018). One potential explanation is that patent 
thickets, especially for digital patents, increase the barrier of technology entry. Since young firms 
typically have limited resources, it is worth future study to understand whether they could 
leverage the same IP strategy—assembling a patent portfolio—that established firms use to 
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navigate through patent thickets. If so, to what extent do young firms contribute to the formation 
of patent thickets?  
In a recent survey of over 5000 American manufacturing firms (Arora et al. 2016), 49% report 
that, between 2007 and 2009, their most important new product originated from outside sources 
such as customers, suppliers, and technology specialists (i.e., universities, independent inventors, 
and R&D contractors). With such a shift toward external sources of invention, it would be 
interesting to compare how externally acquired patents and internally generated patents affect the 
formation of patent thickets.  
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Essay 3 
 
Democratizing Venture Capital Financing for Innovation:  
Crowdfunding under Intellectual Property Rights Governance 
 
 
Abstract 
Crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter are increasingly important for financing innovation 
and entrepreneurship, with the potential to generate high-quality signals that attract venture 
capitalists (VCs) to new regions. Unfortunately, realizing this benefit of crowdfunding platforms 
involves a growing intellectual property rights (IPR) risk from patent assertion entities (PAEs)—
the so-called “patent trolls”—which often send bad-faith demand letters to thousands of 
businesses, counting on their lack of experience with the patent system in order to coerce them 
into paying settlements. By leveraging a quasi-experiment—the enactment of state anti-PAE 
laws in 2010–2017—I use a multi-site entry difference-in-differences relative time model and 
find strong evidence that a state’s enactment of anti-PAE laws is critical in realizing two 
crowdfunding benefits: attracting VC investment into the state and diversifying the investment 
across industries within the state. This study widens the focus of the crowdfunding literature 
from market efficiency to the democratization of the flow of VC financing, while surfacing the 
critical role of institutional governance of IPR risk in achieving this benefit. 
 
Keywords: Crowdfunding, venture capital, innovation, entrepreneurship, patent trolls, 
 intellectual property rights governance 
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Research Problem Formulation 
Crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter are increasingly important for financing innovation 
and entrepreneurship, which in turn generates extensive scholarly conversation on how to 
increase their market efficiency, since they are often viewed as a two-sided market between 
entrepreneurs and funders (Agrawal et al. 2014). Spanning the crowdfunding project lifecycle, 
scholars are interested in (a) the antecedents of entrepreneurs’ participation in a crowdfunding 
project (e.g., Belleflamme et al. 2014); (b) funders’ decision-making processes (e.g., Burtch et al. 
2013; Hong et al. forthcoming); (c) funders’ heterogeneity and dynamics (e.g., Lin et al. 2014); 
and (d) key factors in reaching a project’s funding goal (e.g., Mollick 2014). 
Recent scholarly discussion, however, has shifted its focus from market efficiency to the 
interaction between crowdfunding and professional investors. For example, VCs who once only 
funded entrepreneurs with certain educational, social, and professional characteristics and from 
only a few regions (such as New York, Boston, and the San Francisco Bay Area) are increasingly 
leveraging the high-quality signals from entrepreneurial campaigns on crowdfunding platforms 
to invest in a more diversified group of entrepreneurs (Babich et al. 2018; Drover et al. 2017; 
Roma et al. 2018; Ryu et al. 2018; Sorenson et al. 2016). Thus, crowdfunding not only attracts 
funders to finance entrepreneurs through the platform itself, but also makes entrepreneurs more 
visible to professional investors and democratize their access to such investment. 
Unfortunately, realizing this benefit involves a growing intellectual property rights (IPR) risk 
from patent assertion entities (PAEs)—the so-called “patent trolls”—who acquire a large 
portfolio of patents but do not use them for any research or product development (Cohen et al. 
2016), only to extract payments from alleged infringers with deep pockets via fraudulent claims 
(Cohen et al. 2016; Hagiu and Yoffie 2013). In general, there has been ample documented 
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evidence of the adverse impacts of PAEs on innovation and entrepreneurship. For instance, once 
targeted by PAEs, startups delay their hiring, make changes in their products, shift their business 
strategy, lose valuation from inventors, and even shut down the business line or the entire 
business (Chien 2013). For established firms, attack by PAEs makes them reduce R&D 
investment by 25% and divert resources from new product development (Cohen et al. 2016). 
Entrepreneurs on crowdfunding platforms have also become targets of PAE attacks. For instance, 
Frebble is a Kickstarter project, developed by Holland Haptics, that allows people to hold hands 
with someone at a distance.17 In 2015, right after Holland Haptics successfully pledged €12,260, 
it was sued by a PAE called TZU Technologies,18 which claimed infringement of its patent 
US6368268B1. Kickstarter’s general counsel, Michal Rosenn, who has been in touch with 
Holland Haptics, indicated that “[t]his is a huge problem…They're a tiny team, with very little 
money… It's exactly small businesses that are most vulnerable, because most can't afford to 
litigate. Many businesses get liquidated because of patent trolls.”19 
To extract payments, PAEs often start by sending bad-faith demand letters to thousands of 
businesses. These letters lack the required patent information and request an unreasonable 
license fee in an unreasonably short period of time, but as long as a few businesses quickly settle, 
it earns the PAE a good return on its investment in patents that are often weak and of limited 
validity (American Intellectual Property Law Association 2013). To attract potential funders, 
crowdfunding platforms require entrepreneurs to disclose their entrepreneurial campaign 
information. Such disclosure, however, could draw threats from PAEs, who leverage the 
                                                             
17 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/396691740/hold-hands-online-when-you-
miss-someone. 
18 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from  http://cdn.arstechnica.net/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/ 
TZU.Kickstarter.Complaint.pdf. 
19 Retrieved May 1, 2019, from https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/10/teledildonics-patent-troll-backs-down-
from-lawsuit-against-kickstarter. 
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information to scan for any possible indication that a campaign can be construed to infringe 
patents in their portfolios.  
Under such threats, entrepreneurs tend to disclose less information on the crowdfunding 
platforms, while VCs avoid investing, seeing PAEs as a major deterrent (Feldman 2014). If this 
happens, the entire process of facilitating entrepreneurs’ access to professional investors via 
crowdfunding signaling will break down. This study joins the scholarly conversation on 
crowdfunding platforms—specifically, on their role in democratizing entrepreneurial 
financing—while differentiating itself from past work by addressing the IPR threats brought by 
PAEs. Specifically, it aims to answer the question: Does the institutional governance against 
PAEs affect the ability of crowdfunding platforms to attract VC investment and, if so, how? 
Crowdfunding as Signals for VCs and PAEs 
Technology ventures being inherently uncertain, VCs seek signals of potential success in 
founders’ ability, background, and past successes (Mollick 2014). They focus therefore on 
entrepreneurs with certain educational, social, and professional characteristics and from a small 
number of regions (such as New York, Boston, and the San Francisco Bay Area). Recently, 
however, this approach has changed due to the growing influence of crowdfunding platforms. 
Specifically, the high-quality signals from entrepreneurial campaigns on crowdfunding platforms 
empower VCs to evaluate entrepreneurs’ ability (e.g., their ideas and their ability to build a 
product and deal with logistics and suppliers) and to assess demand prior to the launch of a new 
product, which in turn enables them to invest in a more diversified group of ventures (Babich et 
al. 2018; Drover et al. 2017; Roma et al. 2018; Ryu et al. 2018; Sorenson et al. 2016). However, 
the signals from entrepreneurial campaigns on crowdfunding platforms are as available to PAEs 
as they are to VCs, making it easy for PAEs to identify targets with deep pocket and promising 
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market demand. As policy makers in various states have become increasingly aware of such IPR 
risk, they have designed institutional governance to address it. 
Institutional Governance of PAEs 
Although businesses had the right to sue PAEs even before the enactment of anti-PAE laws, the 
courts could barely penalize PAEs, as they are limited liability business entities. Thus, the 
plaintiff not only could not receive any remedy, but also had to pay the litigation costs. As noted 
by the anti-PAE law in Vermont (9 V.S.A. § 4195), “A business that receives a letter asserting 
such claims faces the threat of expensive and protracted litigation and may feel that it has no 
choice but to settle and to pay a licensing fee, even if the claim is meritless. This is especially so 
for small and medium-sized companies and nonprofits that lack the resources to investigate and 
defend themselves against infringement claims. We seek to change the calculations of patent 
trolls in Vermont by increasing the potential costs of sending out mass demand letters.”  
Anti-PAE laws change that situation. As of 2017, 33 US states have enacted such laws to curtail 
bad-faith demand letters, as shown in Figure 1. 
These laws share two critical components (Appel et al. forthcoming). First, they aim to address 
bad-faith patent-infringement assertions made via demand letters by allowing courts to impose 
penalties on the senders of such letters. Second, they cover any target firm located in the state, 
regardless of where the sender of the letter is located. However, the laws vary in how to penalize 
PAEs via bond requirement and punitive damage remedy and in who can initiate legal action 
against a PAE, as indicated in Table 1. Specifically:  
For bond requirement, 18 of the 33 state laws (55%) establish that if a court finds that a business 
within the focal state has been the target of bad-faith demand letters, then the court can request  
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Figure 1. 
Enactment of Anti-PAE Laws as of 2017 
(states with anti-PAE laws indicated in red) 
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the sender of those letters to post a bond. In Georgia, for example, “a target may move that a bad 
faith assertion of patent infringement has been made in violation of this article and request that a 
protective order be issued as described in this Code section. Upon such motion and a finding by 
the court that a target has established a reasonable likelihood that an author of a demand letter 
has made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement, the court shall require the author of the 
demand letter to post a bond in an amount equal to a good faith estimate of the target's expenses 
of litigation, including an estimate of reasonable attorney's fees, conditioned upon payment of 
any amounts finally determined to be due to the target. A hearing shall be held if either party so 
requests. A bond ordered pursuant to this Code section shall not exceed $250,000.00” (O.C.G.A. 
§ 10-1-772). 
For punitive damage remedy, 20 of the 33 state laws (61%) establish that the recipient of the 
bad-faith demand letters can be awarded damages exceeding simple compensation and awarded 
to punish the defendant. In Georgia, for example, the penalty can be “in an amount equal to 
$50,000.00 or three times the combined total of damages, costs, and fees, whichever is greater” 
(O.C.G.A. § 10-1-773). 
For legal action against PAEs, 24 out of the 33 state laws (73%) establish that the recipient of the 
bad-faith demand letters, in addition to the state’s Attorney General, can bring an action 
individually (private action) against a PAE. In Georgia, for example, “Any person who suffers 
injury or damages as a result of a violation of this article may bring an action individually against 
the person or persons engaged in such violation under the rules of civil procedure to seek 
equitable injunctive relief and to recover his or her general and exemplary damages sustained as 
a consequence thereof in any court having jurisdiction over the defendant” (O.C.G.A. § 10-1-
773).  
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Table 1.  
Enactment Dates and State Differences of State Anti-PAE Laws 
 
State Date enacted Bond requirement 
Punitive damage 
remedy 
Private 
 action 
AL 3/18/2014  Yes Yes 
AZ 3/24/2016   Yes 
CO 6/5/2015    
FL 6/2/2015 Yes Yes Yes 
GA 4/15/2014 Yes Yes Yes 
ID 3/26/2014 Yes Yes Yes 
IL 8/26/2014   Yes 
IN 5/5/2015 Yes Yes Yes 
KS 5/20/2015    
LA 5/28/2014    
MD 5/5/2014  Yes Yes 
ME 4/14/2014 Yes Yes Yes 
MI 1/6/2017 Yes Yes Yes 
MN 4/29/2016    
MO 7/8/2014   Yes 
MS 3/28/2015 Yes Yes Yes 
MT 4/2/2015 Yes Yes Yes 
NC 8/6/2014 Yes Yes Yes 
ND 3/26/2015 Yes Yes Yes 
NH 7/11/2014 Yes  Yes 
OK 5/16/2014 Yes Yes  
OR 3/3/2014    
RI 6/14/2016 Yes Yes Yes 
SC 6/9/2016 Yes  Yes 
SD 3/31/2014 Yes Yes Yes 
TN 5/1/2014 Yes Yes Yes 
TX 6/17/2015    
UT 4/1/2014 Yes Yes Yes 
VA 5/23/2014    
VT 5/22/2013 Yes Yes Yes 
WA 4/25/2015    
WI 4/23/2014  Yes Yes 
WY 3/11/2016  Yes Yes 
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Research Design 
Data 
My analysis is based on state-quarter level data constructed from the following datasets:  
State anti-PAE law data. I download the full text of anti-PAE laws for 33 states as of 2017 from 
LexisNexis. I code each law based on the two dimensions shown in Table 1: penalty (bond 
requirement and punitive damage remedy) and private right to take legal action (private action). 
Venture capital investment data. VC investment information is from Thomson Reuters’s 
VentureXpert database, which characterizes VC investments into portfolio companies, regardless 
of the investment outcome. Consistent with Sorenson et al. (2016) and Appel et al. 
(forthcoming), I focus on early-stage VC rounds raised by firms with headquarters in the United 
States. I use the number of VC investments within a state as a proxy for VC activity in that state.  
Kickstarter campaign data. I draw 2010–2017 crowdfunding data from Kickstarter—the largest 
rewards-based crowdfunding platform by traffic, number of backers, and total dollars pledged 
(Yu et al. 2017) and has been used by Sorenson et al. (2016) as a proxy for crowdfunding 
activity—to understand the relationship between state-level crowdfunding and VC investments. I 
identify the geographic location for each Kickstarter project and use the number of Kickstarter 
projects ended within a state as a proxy for crowdfunding activity in that state. To identify 
Kickstarter campaigns that are of interest to VCs, I select successful campaigns that (a) are in the 
technology category (Sorenson et al. 2016), (b) have above the median number of backers and 
above the median amount of funding target (Babich et al. 2018; Roma et al. 2018), and (c) have 
below the median amount of VC investment (Babich et al. 2018). 
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Patent data. I use the USPTO PatentsView platform—a database that longitudinally links 
inventors and their organizations, locations, and overall patenting activity—to collect utility 
patents associated with a state, based on the location of the first assignee at the time of grant, for 
2010–2017.   
Patent litigation data. I obtain patent cases for patent district courts in each state from 
LexMachina, an analytics platform that includes litigation information regarding patent, 
trademark, copyright, antitrust, securities, commercial, employment, product liability, and 
bankruptcy.  
State economic indicator data. Data on the per-capita personal income and GDP for each state-
quarter 2010–2017 comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis database. 
Self-employment data. Self-employment numbers for each state-quarter from 2010–2017 are 
extracted from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) Current Population Survey 
(CPS), administered monthly by the US Bureau of the Census to over 65,000 households. This 
survey gathers information on education, labor force status, demographics, and other aspects of 
the US population and is widely used by demographers, economists, sociologists, and other 
population-related researchers. It is also the basis upon which monthly federal unemployment 
statistics are calculated. 
Aggregating all data to the state-quarter level, I obtain 1,500 observations from 2010–2017 for 
analysis. Table 2 provides descriptive information on the sample. 
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Table 2.  
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. dev. 
VC Number of VC investments in the categories of communication, computer hardware, computer software, consumer-related, industrial/energy, internet-specific, and semiconductor/electronic 17.88 66.49 
IndexVC Herfindhal index of VC investments in the categories of communication, computer hardware, computer software, consumer-related, industrial/energy, internet-specific, and semiconductor/electronic 0.69 0.26 
KS 
Number of successful Kickstarter campaigns that (a) are in the technology category, (b) have above the 
median number of backers and above the median amount of funding target, and (c) have below the 
median of VC investment 
1.03 2.57 
GDP State GDP ($million) 329441.60 416979.90 
Income State per-capita personal income 45091.79 8364.99 
Patent Number of utility patents associated with a state, based on the location of the first assignee at the time of grant 563.22 1280.29 
Patent Litigation Number of patent litigations assigned to the state patent district courts 29.17 78.22 
Self-employment Number of self-employed individuals in the state based on CPS survey sample  (N=65,000 households) 137.72 97.77 
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Methods 
Matching between Kickstarter campaigns and VC investments. VCs invest in some industries for 
which one would not see Kickstarter campaigns. For example, Kickstarter excludes campaigns 
for biotechnology. I therefore restrict the VC industries included to those that matched 
Kickstarter campaigns in the category of technology and confirm those matches via text analysis 
of the descriptions of Kickstarter campaigns and VC investments. Specifically, I match 
Kickstarter campaign categories to VC investments industries via two algorithms: term 
frequency-inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) (Manning and Schutze 2008) and Doc2Vec (Le 
and Mikolov 2014).  
To prepare the inputs for these two algorithms, I construct a corpus that includes descriptions of 
(a) Kickstarter campaigns that belong to one of a set of mutually exclusive Kickstarter categories 
(art, comics, crafts, dance, design, fashion, food, games, journalism, music, photography, 
publishing, technology, theater, and film and video) and (b) VC investments that are associated 
with one of a set of mutually exclusive VC industries (biotechnology, business services, 
communications, computer hardware, computer software, consumer-related, industrial/energy, 
internet-specific, medical/health, and semiconductor/electronic). I tokenize this corpus by (a) 
removing punctuation, (b) lowercasing all letters, (c) keeping words with length of 3–15 letters, 
and (d) stemming all words. After vectorization, I create a word frequency matrix with each row 
representing a Kickstarter campaign/VC investment description and each column representing 
the number of times the corresponding word appears in the description. 
I apply the TF-IDF algorithm to this word frequency matrix to convert it into a TF-IDF-weighted 
word frequency matrix. The intuition of the TF-IDF algorithm is to increase a word’s weight if it 
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appears frequently in a particular Kickstarter campaign/VC investment description and decrease 
its weight if it also appears in other Kickstarter campaign/VC investment descriptions. 
Next, I aggregate the TF-IDF-weighted word frequency matrix to the Kickstarter-category or 
VC-industry level. Specifically, I take an average across the rows for Kickstarter campaigns 
related to a particular category or for VC investments in a particular industry to produce a single 
vector of weighted word frequency for each. I use these vectors to calculate the cosine similarity 
between each Kickstarter category and VC industry, ending up with 150 cosine similarity values 
(15 Kickstarter categories * 10 VC industries). I rank these values—with 1 representing the 
highest similarity value—leading to a similarity ranking matrix, as shown in Figure 2.  To 
identify the VC industries that correspond closely to a Kickstarter technology category, I select 
communications, computer hardware, computer software, consumer-related, internet-specific, 
and semiconductor/electronics, as they are among the top 10 in the similarity ranking. 
A potential problem with the TF-IDF algorithm is that it is based on a bag-of-words model. 
Therefore, it does not take semantics and word order into consideration. To address these 
weaknesses, I applied the Doc2Vec algorithm to the word frequency matrix so that each 
Kickstarter campaign/VC investment description is mapped to a unique vector. As in the TF-IDF 
process, I (a) take an average across the rows for Kickstarter campaigns related to a particular 
category or for VC investments in a particular industry to produce a single vector for each, (b) 
calculate pairwise cosine similarity, and (c) generate a similarity ranking matrix, as shown in 
Figure 3. In addition to the VC industries selected by the TF-IDF algorithm, I include 
industrial/energy, as the Doc2Vec algorithm indicates that it corresponds closely to a Kickstarter 
technology category. 
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Figure 2. 
The Ranking of TF-IDF Pairwise Cosine Similarity Values  
between Kickstarter Categories and VC Industries 
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Figure 3. 
The Ranking of Doc2Vec Pairwise Cosine Similarity Values  
between Kickstarter Categories and VC Industries 
 
71 
 
Econometric model specification. I use a multi-site entry difference-in-differences relative time 
model (Autor 2003) based on the quasi-experiment of the enactment of state anti-PAE laws. As 
indicated in Appel et al. (forthcoming), this empirical setting allows the same state to be part of 
the treatment and control groups at different times. Specifically, at any year-quarter t, the control 
group includes both states that passed anti-PAE laws after t (but before 2018)—therefore will be 
treated eventually—and states that are never treated (because they never passed an anti-PAE law 
during the sample period). 
To investigate how the anti-PAE laws affect the relationship between Kickstarter campaigns and 
VC investment, I construct two baseline models: 
!"#$%&(()*) = - + 	∑ 12345&()262786 × !"#:;&( +	1* × !"#:;&( + 1< × !"#=>3&(	
										+1? × !"#@AB"CD&( + 16 × !"#3EFDAF&( + 1G × !"#3EFDAF!HFH#EFH"A&(	
										+1I × !"#;DJK5CLJ"MCDAF&( + 	N&	 + 	O(	 + 	P&( 
…… Equation (1) 
 
 
@AQDR$%&(()*) = - + 	 ∑ 12345&()262786 × !"#:;&( +	1* × !"#:;&( + 1< × !"#=>3&(	
																		+1? × !"#@AB"CD&( + 16 × !"#3EFDAF&( + 1G × !"#3EFDAF!HFH#EFH"A&(	
																																														+1I × !"#;DJK5CLJ"MCDAF&( + 	N&	 + 	O(	 + 	P&(, 
…… Equation (2) 
where i denotes state and t denotes year-quarter. 345&()2 is a dummy that equals 1 for 
observations in quarter t. Specifically, (a) for τ =0, quarter t is when the anti-PAE law is enacted; 
(b) for 0<τ<4, quarter t is τ quarters after the enactment; (c) for τ=4, quarter t is four or more 
quarters after; and (d) for τ <0, quarter t is |τ| quarters before the anti-PAE law is enacted. N&	 is a 
state fixed effect, which controls for state characteristics that do not vary over the sample period. 
O(	 is a year-quarter fixed effect, which absorbs aggregate shocks affecting all states. In all 
specifications, I cluster the robust standard errors at the state level. Table 2 provides definitions 
of the other variables. 
  
72 
 
Results 
Main result. I first explore whether the enactment of state anti-PAE laws helps the signals from 
Kickstarter attract VC investment into the state. After controlling for several state-specific 
dynamic factors, the log-transformed linear regression analysis (Model 2 in Table 3) indicates 
that two quarters after the law is enacted, a 1% increase in the number of Kickstarter campaigns 
in a state-quarter is related to a 0.359% (t=3.07, p<0.01; Model 2 in Table 4) increase in the 
number of VC investments in the following state-quarter. The coefficients of pre-treatment 
trends are all insignificant, showing the validity of using the untreated states as controls.  
Robustness tests. I conduct a battery of robustness analyses,20 as shown in Table 3, to reduce the 
possibility that my findings are due to confounding factors. First, as mentioned by Sorenson et al. 
(2016), the number of Kickstarter campaigns could be endogenous. As Kickstarter campaigns in 
comics and dance categories are of no interest to VC investors, I adopt a similar instrument 
variable—the number of successful Kickstarter campaigns in those categories—and reestimate 
the model. The relationship is even stronger (0.651%, z=3.08, p<0.01; Model 3 in Table 4). 
Next, to tease out the possibility that state-specific VC investment trends may contaminate the 
results, I include the state-specific linear trend in the model specification. Again, I see a strong 
relationship (0.527%, z=2.74, p<0.01; model 4 in Table 4) between Kickstarter campaigns and 
VC investment (see Figure 4). Another concern arises from the possibility that the finding is due 
to the timing of the enactment of anti-PAE laws being related to both Kickstarter campaigns and 
VC investments. I therefore conduct a placebo test (Model 5 in Table 4). That is, I assume that 
the anti-PAE laws were enacted two years earlier than their actual enactment date across states. 
                                                             
20
 Appel et al. (forthcoming) indicate that enactment of the laws is driven by persistent characteristics of the states 
(captured by the state fixed-effects in the models) rather than by changes in their economic conditions. 
73 
 
In this hypothetical scenario, the empirical evidence (all post-enactment coefficients are 
insignificant) helps rule out this explanation.  
Table 3. 
Model Specifications to Evaluate Effect of State Anti-PAE Law Enactment on the 
Relationship between Kickstarter Campaigns and VC Investment in a State-Quarter 
 
Model Specification Rationale 
Model 1 
Log-OLS without leading and lagging PAE 
indicators 
Baseline analysis 
Model 2 
Log-OLS with leading and lagging PAE 
indicators 
Baseline analysis 
Model 3 
Log-2SLS based on the instrument variable 
of KS activity in the categories of dance and 
comics 
KS activity could be endogenous 
Model 4 Log-2SLS with state-specific linear trend 
State-specific VC investment trend may 
contaminate results 
Model 5 
Log-2SLS with state-specific linear trend 
based on a placebo test that assumes 
enactment 2 years earlier than the actual 
enactment date 
A possibility that the finding is due to the 
enactment timing of anti-PAE laws being 
related to both Kickstarter campaigns and 
VC investment 
 
Figure 4.  
Effect of State Anti-PAE Law Enactment on the Relationship between  
Number of Kickstarter Campaigns and Number of VC Investments in a State-Quarter 
Note: The coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are derived from Model 4 in Table 4. 
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Table 4. 
Effect of State Anti-PAE Law Enactment on the Relationship between  
Number of Kickstarter Campaigns and Number of VC Investments in a State-Quarter 
 
DV= Log (# VC Investments) 
 Variable  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Log KS 0.0266 -0.0934 0.0187 -0.220 -0.333 
  (0.63) (-1.54) (0.06) (-0.61) (-0.69) 
PAE(-4) * Log KS 
 
0.231 0.0762 -0.0586 -0.0839 
  
 
(1.55) (0.36) (-0.30) (-0.17) 
PAE(-3) * Log KS 
 
-0.000792 0.0945 0.0547 0.0641 
  
 
(-0.01) (0.53) (0.30) (0.12) 
PAE(-2) * Log KS 
 
-0.0148 0.252 0.180 -0.459 
  
 
(-0.10) (1.18) (0.86) (-0.83) 
PAE(-1) * Log KS 
Omitted as baseline 
  
PAE(0) * Log KS  0.0840 0.149 0.0697 0.299 
   (0.73) (1.17) (0.52) (0.89) 
PAE(1) * Log KS  0.0599 0.142 0.133 -0.0495 
   (0.46) (0.79) (0.80) (-0.14) 
PAE(2) * Log KS  0.359** 0.651** 0.527** 0.183 
   (3.07) (3.08) (2.74) (0.56) 
PAE(3) * Log KS  0.343* 0.668*** 0.596*** 0.251 
   (2.38) (3.67) (3.41) (0.87) 
PAE(4+) * Log KS  0.161* 0.358* 0.312+ 0.350 
   (2.09) (2.31) (1.73) (1.12) 
Log GDP 1.317* 1.182+ 0.891 0.205 0.502 
  (2.07) (1.93) (1.58) (0.21) (0.50) 
Log Income -0.333 -0.294 -0.658 0.544 0.0302 
  (-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.48) (0.35) (0.02) 
Log Patent 0.227** 0.219* 0.178* 0.133+ 0.133+ 
  (2.70) (2.54) (2.04) (1.94) (1.89) 
Log Patent Litigation 0.00208 0.000505 -0.00451 0.0204 0.0234 
  (0.07) (0.02) (-0.15) (0.66) (0.73) 
Log Self Employment -0.0556 -0.0476 -0.0194 -0.0684 -0.0474 
  (-0.62) (-0.53) (-0.20) (-0.52) (-0.38) 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year_Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State Trend FE    Y Y 
N 1500 1500 1500 1500 1530 
Note: PAE indicators identify quarters t-4, t-3, …, t, …, t+3, and t>=4 for states that enact an anti-PAE law, 
where t is the quarter in which the law is enacted. States that enacted an anti-PAE law in the fourth quarter of 
2016 or later, for which I observe fewer than four post-treatment observations, are excluded from the treatment 
group. Robust standard errors are clustered by state. z statistics in parentheses. +p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001. 
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Concentration of VC investment. One might wonder whether the VC investments attracted by the 
signals on entrepreneurial activity from Kickstarter (a) flow only to those industries in a state in 
which VCs specialize or (b) transcend such specialization. I construct an industry concentration 
index of VC investment and examine whether the enactment of state anti-PAE laws helps 
Kickstarter attract VC investment across industries into the state. As in the previous analysis, I 
conduct a range of tests based on the model specifications in Table 3 and find a strong and robust 
negative relationship between Kickstarter campaigns in a state and the industry concentration 
index of VC investment flowing into that state. Specifically, once the anti-PAE law is enacted, a 
1% increase in the number of Kickstarter campaigns in a state-quarter is related to a 0.125 (z=-
2.57, p<0.05; Model 4 in Table 5) decrease in the industry concentration index of VC investment 
in the following state-quarter (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. 
Effect of State Anti-PAE Law Enactment on the Relationship between  
Number of Kickstarter Campaigns and VC Industry Concentration in a State-Quarter  
Note: The coefficients and 95% confidence intervals are derived from Model 4 in Table 5. 
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Table 5. 
Effect of State Anti-PAE Law Enactment on the Relationship between  
Number of Kickstarter Campaigns and VC Industry Concentration in State-Quarter 
 
DV= VC Industry Concentration Index 
  Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Log KS 0.0171 0.0602* 0.224+ 0.308+ 0.289 
  (0.91) (2.46) (1.92) (1.65) (1.35) 
PAE(-4) * Log KS 
 
0.0637 0.0549 0.0895 0.360 
  
 
(1.18) (1.03) (1.20) (1.22) 
PAE(-3) * Log KS 
 
0.0239 -0.0655 -0.0635 -0.00110 
  
 
(0.45) (-0.90) (-0.95) (-0.01) 
PAE(-2) * Log KS  0.0180 -0.0629 -0.0436 0.0688 
   (0.45) (-1.24) (-0.88) (0.36) 
PAE(-1) * Log KS 
Omitted as baseline 
  
PAE(0) * Log KS  -0.0444 -0.140*** -0.125* 0.00211 
   (-1.10) (-3.44) (-2.57) (0.02) 
PAE(1) * Log KS  -0.0374 -0.123* -0.125* -0.0799 
   (-0.89) (-2.16) (-2.02) (-0.65) 
PAE(2) * Log KS  -0.0738 -0.103 -0.0876 -0.122 
   (-1.45) (-1.32) (-1.08) (-0.85) 
PAE(3) * Log KS  -0.105* -0.138+ -0.124+ -0.0994 
   (-2.07) (-1.95) (-1.67) (-0.93) 
PAE(4+) * Log KS  -0.0682* -0.135* -0.106 -0.127 
  
 
(-2.14) (-2.08) (-1.40) (-1.29) 
Log GDP -0.568 -0.507 -0.666 -0.473 -0.543 
  (-0.93) (-0.94) (-1.26) (-0.63) (-0.72) 
Log Income 0.707 0.585 0.413 -0.401 0.228 
  (1.12) (1.02) (0.74) (-0.36) (0.21) 
Log Patent 0.0188 0.0245 0.0222 0.0676 0.0722 
  (0.50) (0.64) (0.53) (0.79) (0.99) 
Log Patent Litigation -0.00452 -0.00334 -0.00436 -0.0152 -0.0159 
  (-0.23) (-0.17) (-0.23) (-0.86) (-0.90) 
Log Self Employment 0.000286 0.00537 0.00284 -0.00168 -0.00250 
  (0.01) (0.13) (0.07) (-0.02) (-0.03) 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Year_Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State Trend FE    Y Y 
N 881 881 881 881 910 
Note: PAE indicators identify quarters t-4, t-3, …, t, …, t+3, and t>=4 for states that enact an anti-PAE law, 
where t is the quarter in which the law is enacted. States that enacted an anti-PAE law in the fourth quarter of 
2016 or later, for which I observe fewer than four post-treatment observations, are excluded from the treatment 
group. I also exclude state-quarters with no VC investment. Robust standard errors are clustered by state. z 
statistics in parentheses. +p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Heterogeneous effects based on law difference. So far, I treat the existence of anti-PAE laws as a 
binary variable, but there is heterogeneity in these laws across states in terms of penalty (bond 
requirement and punitive damage remedy) and private right to take legal action (private action).  
I create three binary variables to differentiate state anti-PAE laws on these two dimensions. I find 
consistent and robust heterogeneous effects of those laws in promoting the positive influence of 
Kickstarter crowdfunding activity in a state on VC investment in that state, based on Model 4 in 
Table 3. Penalties for PAEs show stronger effects than the private right to take legal action in 
terms of both attracting and diversifying VC investment in the state. Specifically, as indicated in 
Table 6, two quarters after the law is enacted, a 1% increase in the number of Kickstarter 
campaigns in a state-quarter is related to a 0.782% (bond requirement; z=3.76, p<0.001), a 
0.809% (punitive damage remedy; z=3.7, p<0.001), or a 0.242% (private action; z=1.06, p>0.1) 
increase in the number of VC investments in the following state-quarter. For VC investment 
concentration, once the anti-PAE laws are enacted, a 1% increase in the number of Kickstarter 
campaigns in a state-quarter is related to a 0.177% (bond requirement; z=-2.76, p<0.01), a 
0.191% (punitive damage remedy; z=-2.63, p<0.01), or a 0.128% (private action; z=-1.73, p<0.1) 
decrease in the industry concentration index of VC investment in the following state-quarter.  
  
78 
 
 
Table 6. 
Effect of State Anti-PAE Law Difference on the Relationship between  
Kickstarter Campaigns and VC Investment in State-Quarter 
 
Variable 
DV= Log (# VC Investments) DV= VC Industry Concentration Index  
Bond Remedy Private Bond Remedy Private 
Log KS -0.381 -0.405 -0.210 0.328 0.370 0.337 
  (-1.28) (-1.09) (-0.57) (1.50) (1.56) (1.51) 
PAE(-4) * Log KS -0.506 -0.504 -0.461 0.253* 0.267+ 0.184 
  (-1.25) (-0.91) (-1.44) (2.14) (1.78) (1.20) 
PAE(-3) * Log KS 0.168 0.227 0.0480 -0.0324 -0.128 -0.0895 
  (0.39) (0.57) (0.17) (-0.20) (-0.85) (-0.81) 
PAE(-2) * Log KS -0.196 0.114 0.0492 -0.0676 -0.0563 -0.0461 
  (-0.61) (0.32) (0.17) (-0.72) (-0.59) (-0.63) 
PAE(-1) * Log KS 
Omitted as baseline 
 
PAE(0) * Log KS 0.266 0.321 0.0757 -0.177** -0.191** -0.128+ 
  (1.62) (1.53) (0.42) (-2.76) (-2.63) (-1.73) 
PAE(1) * Log KS 0.347* 0.318+ 0.0369 -0.174+ -0.207+ -0.137 
  (2.21) (1.86) (0.16) (-1.86) (-1.92) (-1.38) 
PAE(2) * Log KS 0.782*** 0.809*** 0.242 -0.118 -0.133 -0.132 
  (3.76) (3.39) (1.06) (-0.93) (-1.09) (-1.52) 
PAE(3) * Log KS 0.728*** 0.792*** 0.467* -0.163 -0.213* -0.121 
  (5.07) (4.19) (1.97) (-1.53) (-2.11) (-1.26) 
PAE(4+) * Log KS 0.224 0.307 0.0230 -0.0695 -0.105 -0.0641 
  (1.26) (1.40) (0.11) (-0.47) (-0.79) (-0.60) 
Log GDP 0.348 0.359 0.443 -0.393 -0.347 -0.340 
  (0.35) (0.36) (0.45) (-0.49) (-0.43) (-0.43) 
Log Income 0.0142 0.113 0.0522 0.0742 -0.00937 -0.121 
  (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (-0.01) (-0.11) 
Log Patent 0.147* 0.135* 0.144* 0.0752 0.0827 0.0776 
  (2.21) (2.03) (2.15) (0.82) (0.92) (0.85) 
Log Patent Litigation 0.0228 0.0204 0.0187 -0.0141 -0.0164 -0.0145 
  (0.73) (0.64) (0.59) (-0.77) (-0.88) (-0.80) 
Log Self 
Employment 
-0.109 -0.107 -0.0944 0.00531 0.0127 0.0106 
  (-0.87) (-0.81) (-0.73) (0.07) (0.18) (0.15) 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year_Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State Trend FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 1500 1500 1500 881 881 881 
 
Note: PAE indicators identify quarters t-4, t-3, …, t, …, t+3, and t>=4 for states that enact a specific dimension (i.e., bond, 
remedy, private) of an anti-PAE law, where t is the quarter in which that dimension is enacted. States that enacted an anti-
PAE law in the fourth quarter of 2016 or later, for which I observe fewer than four post-treatment observations, are 
excluded from the treatment group. Robust standard errors are clustered by state. z statistics in parentheses. +p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
  
79 
 
Discussion 
Conclusion. This study introduces the idea that crowdfunding platforms are a source of signals 
for VCs but also for PAEs. It provides evidence that signals from crowdfunding platforms on 
entrepreneurial activity can attract VC investment when the risk of PAEs is mitigated by anti-
PAE laws.  The signals also diversify the flow of VC investment across industries. Finally, this 
study reveals that these benefits of crowdfunding platforms are better safeguarded by anti-PAE 
laws that impose penalties (bond requirement and punitive damage remedy) than by those that 
provide the private right to take legal action. 
Contribution. This study contributes to an emerging research stream on how crowdfunding 
interacts with professional investors such as VCs in democratizing financing for innovation and 
entrepreneurship. The current scholarly conversation indicates that the high-quality signals from 
entrepreneurial campaigns on crowdfunding platforms empower VCs to evaluate entrepreneurs’ 
ability and to assess demand prior to the launch of a new product. As a result, crowdfunding 
makes entrepreneurs more visible to professional investors and democratizes entrepreneurs’ 
access to such investment. However, as documented in this study, the signals from 
entrepreneurial campaigns on crowdfunding platforms are also available to PAEs, so that the 
benefit of crowdfunding comes with risk. This study addresses that tension, extending the 
research framework for understanding the benefit of crowdfunding platforms with respect to 
democratizing entrepreneurial financing by introducing the perspective of IPR risk and how it 
can be regulated through institutional governance to enjoy the benefits of crowdfunding.   
This study also informs a debate among policy makers on the benefits and costs of PAEs to the 
economy (Federal Trade Commission 2016) by presenting evidence that state anti-PAE policy is 
critical in realizing two benefits from crowdfunding platforms: attracting VC investment into the 
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state and diversifying it across industries within the state. While I focus on a reward-based 
crowdfunding platform—Kickstarter—my results also have implications for equity-based 
crowdfunding. Policy makers have enacted a number of laws and regulations for equity-based 
crowdfunding, such as the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, to expand companies’ 
access to entrepreneurial finance, hoping that the funded companies will create jobs and spur 
economic growth. To protect retail investors, the US Security and Exchange Committee requires 
companies that seek equity-based crowdfunding to disclose information ranging from a business 
description to financial information to the management team. Such disclosure, however, provides 
opportunities for PAEs to evaluate infringement against their patent portfolios. In addition, 
equity-based crowdfunding campaigns tend to have deeper pockets, which make them more 
attractive to cash-hungry PAEs (Cohen et al. 2016). Therefore, policy makers face a dilemma. 
On one hand, they need to design policies to reduce information asymmetry between retail 
investors and funded companies by requiring more disclosure. On the other hand, more 
disclosure increases the risk from PAEs. This study indicates that state anti-PAE laws are a 
promising solution. 
Limitations and future research. One should be careful in interpreting these findings, in light of 
some limitations. First, I am unable to observe PAEs’ behavior of sending demand letters. As a 
result, the underlying mechanism that drives the results could come because anti-PAE laws 
reduce the number of demand letters or because they decrease the severity of the threat as 
perceived by entrepreneurs or VCs or both. Second, while anti-PAE laws can potentially increase 
the quantity of information disclosed by entrepreneurs on crowdfunding platforms and 
incentivize VCs to invest in the state, I do not have the data with which to provide empirical 
evidence of such benefits from anti-PAE laws. Third, my results do not address the long-term 
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effects of anti-PAE laws in promoting the influence of a state’s crowdfunding activity on VC 
investments in that state. The long-term effect disappears when I include state-specific linear 
trends in the model. One possible explanation is that the effect of anti-PAE laws is still there but 
is absorbed in the state trend a few quarters after the laws are enacted. As I do not provide direct 
empirical evidence corresponding to this explanation, I do not claim a long-term effect. Future 
research can enrich my findings by (a) providing project-level evidence by identifying 
Kickstarter projects that received VC investment, (b) exploring how anti-PAE laws affect the 
information disclosure and VC investment incentive to illuminate the underlying mechanism, 
and (c) examining the effects of anti-PAE laws on different types of VC investment (corporate 
vs. independent).  
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